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I. Introduction: Transitional Justice and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the 



























I Introduction: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the 
Context of Conflict 
 
 
Certainly, advances have been made in recognizing women’s rights. The 
legal framework is increasingly responsive to the experiences of women 
and girls in conflict, especially in cases of sexual violence, as we have 
seen in the important work being carried out by the international criminal 
tribunals. But there remains much to be done, particularly to improve 
prevention and to combat impunity.  
Kofi Annan 




Many countries in Africa have experienced conflicts characterized by gross human rights 
violations, including widespread and systematic sexual and gender-based violence. 
Several of these are currently grappling with the difficult issue of addressing the wrongs 
of the past while at the same time trying to secure a stable and democratic future. This 
study considers what an appropriate model of transitional justice should be in the African 
context, particularly as pertains to crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. This 
chapter will briefly illustrate the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence in 
conflict situations, particularly in Rwanda, note the legal developments made thus far, 
and establish the aim of this particular study.  
I.2 Background and Problem Statement 
 
The systematic and widespread nature of sexual violence in conflict situations is not a 
recent phenomenon by any means. In the 1970s, Bangladeshi women suffered sexual 
abuse at the hands of Pakistani soldiers; Turkish soldiers subjected women in Cyprus to 
sexual abuse during the latter’s occupation; Vietnamese women were preyed upon 





Security Forces in Peru raped civilian women whilst in pursuit of guerrillas.1 Rape and 
other acts of sexual violence have been used throughout history as weapons of war, not 
only as attacks on individual victims, but also as a means to ‘humiliate, shame, degrade 
and terrify the entire … group.’2 In her exploration of legal protection against sexual 
violence in armed conflicts, Lyth notes that there are several reasons why women are 
targeted and several ways in which sexual violence is perpetrated:  
 
Rape can be used in order to terrorize the civilian population and to induce 
civilians to flee their homes and villages. It can be a means to humiliate the 
rival army by showing control over ‘their’ women. It can be used as a ‘perk’ 
for soldiers and as an inducement to courage on the battlefield. Forced 
prostitution can be used as a morale booster for the solders and as a way to 
make the women feel responsible for their own violation. Forced 
impregnation and forced pregnancy can be used to deepen the humiliation 
and to produce babies of the ethnicity of the rapists.3 
 
The use of sexual violence during conflict, therefore, takes numerous forms and is 
inflicted upon women for varying reasons. In this sense, sexual violence is a crucial 
psychological and physical tool of armed conflict harnessed not only to inflict torturous 
physical harm, but also to break the spirits of the victims, and subsequently destroy the 
fabric of the society in general.   
  
The gross violations of human rights that characterized the campaigns of ethnic cleansing 
and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda brought the use of sexual violence as 
a weapon of war to the forefront. When the Rwanda genocide occurred in 1994, initially 
no accounts were reported of the brutal rapes and acts of sexual torture that were key 
tools of the genocide.4 According to research that was carried out in the aftermath of the 
genocide, however, it was discovered that sexual violence was not only brutal, but also 
                                                 
1  Annette Lyth, ‘The development of legal protection against sexual violence in armed conflicts—
advantages and disadvantages’ (2001) at 13. Available at 
http://www.iktk.se/publikationer/rapporter/pdf/development.pdf  [Accessed 6 September 2006]. 
2 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia (1993) cited in Theodore Meron ‘Rape as a crime under international humanitarian 
law’ American Journal of International Law (1993) 87: 424 at 425.  
3 Lyth Supra note 1 at 2. 






widespread and systematic. The gruesome and horrifying testimonies collected by 
survivors’ organizations, human rights groups, and the United Nations are a testament to 
the fact that the cruel and vicious nature of the violence carried out during the Rwanda 
genocide ‘assumed gender-specific forms, affecting females differently than males.’5  
Approximately 250,000 Rwandan women were subjected to various forms of sexual 
violence including rape, sexual torture, sexual mutilation, and sexual slavery, often at the 
hands of HIV-positive men, during and after the genocide.6  More recently, in Sierra 
Leone, it is estimated that 215,000-257,000 women have been targets of rape, sexual 
mutilation, forced labour, forced conscription, and sexual slavery.7 Although the nature 
and circumstances of the conflicts in Rwanda and in Sierra Leone were markedly 
different, in both countries women were specifically targeted as victims of rape, sexual 
violence, sexual torture, sexual mutilation, and sexual slavery. In both cases, sexual and 
gender-based violence was systematic, particularly brutal, and widespread, and its effects 
protracted, complex, and multi-layered.  
 
The horrific acts of sexual and gender-based violence inflicted upon women and girls in 
conflict situations result in permanent scars on the collective psyche of each society. The 
impact of such atrocities is immeasurable. What is more evident, however, is the fact that 
‘[m]ass violence results in the breakdown of societal structures—social and economic 
institutions, and networks of familial and intimate relationships that provide the 
foundation for a functioning community.’8 Given this situation, the pursuit of justice 
must not only be done, but seen to be done, and this must include implementing 
measures that ensure not only that the perpetrators are held accountable for their actions, 
but that adequate redress is provided for the victims of these gross violations of human 
rights in order to provide a solid foundation for the rebuilding of such fragmented 
societies.  
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 United Nations ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by René Degni-Ségui, 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission for Human Rights’ (1996) (E/CN.4/1996/68). Available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/68-rwa.htm [Accessed on 5 May 2006]. 
7 Binaifer Nowrojee, ‘Making the invisible war crime visible: post conflict justice for Sierra Leone’s rape 
victims’ Harvard Human Rights Journal (2005) 18: 85 at 90. 
8 Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein ‘Violence and social repair: rethinking the contribution of justice to 





When faced with a society recovering from such mass atrocities, countries have a legal 
obligation to provide redress for the victims. According to Weinstein and Stover, 
‘individuals need some form of justice to acknowledge the wrongs done to them, just as 
societies need it to establish boundaries by which individuals can be held responsible for 
their behaviour toward their fellow citizens.’9  
 
With regards to crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly those that were 
systematic and widespread such as the examples cited above, acknowledgement and 
accountability are central to the process of rebuilding a functioning society. According to 
Sierra Leonean survivor and activist Isha Dyfan, ‘[w]e need to hear that these atrocities 
are condemned to at least relieve some of the shame and the grief. It is not just a legal 
issue. It is about people’s lives. Something must be done so the society that was affected 
by the conflict can invest in peace.’ 10  Since women have historically been 
underrepresented in the judicial process,11 it is imperative that provisions are made in 
international human rights and international humanitarian law that ‘take women’s 
experiences of sexual violence as a starting point rather than just a by-product of war.’12 
 
It is worth noting, however, that as a result of developments in international law over the 
past twelve years, it is now possible to convict perpetrators of sexual violence for rape as 
a war crime, a crime against humanity, or as an act of genocide or torture if their actions 
meet the elements of each. These developments are reflected in the statutes and case law 
of the ad-hoc international tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia [ICTY] and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  [ICTR]), the 
Statute of International Criminal Court, and the statute of ‘hybrid courts’13 such as the 
                                                 
9 Harvey M. Weinstein and Eric Stover ‘Introduction: Conflict, Justice, and Reclamation’ in Eric Stover 
and Harvey Weinstein (eds.) My neighbor, my enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass 
atrocity (2004): 1 at 11. 
10 Nowrojee Supra note 7 at 88. 
11 Ibid., at 89. 
12 Kelly Dawn Askin as cited in Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf  ‘Women, war, peace: the 
independent experts’ assessment on the impact of armed conflict on women and women’s role in 
peacebuilding (Progress of the world’s women)’ (2002) 1: 89. Available at 
http://www.womenwarpeace.org [Accessed on 5 September 2006). 
13  Project on International Courts and Tribunals ‘Hybrid Courts.’ Available at http://www.pict-





Special Court for Sierra Leone. Furthermore, perpetrators can be convicted for acts of 
sexual violence in both internal and international conflict, and leaders in positions of 
command responsibility (i.e. those in the position to issue orders) who knew or should 
have had reason to know of such abuses and who took no steps to stop subordinates who 
committed sex crimes, can be held accountable.14 
 
In spite of these laudable developments, however, numerous obstacles and barriers to 
justice for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence persist both at the national and 
international level mainly due to shortcomings in the implementation of international 
human rights law. Transitional societies are tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that 
their approach to transitional justice reflects the above legal developments, but 
unfortunately, these developments do not always translate in terms of implementation at 
the domestic level. It must be noted that failing to address crimes of sexual and gender-
based violence is a betrayal not only of the direct victims of conflict, but of society as a 
whole. Furthermore, the failure encourages a lack of respect for human rights and 
nurtures a culture of impunity that will inevitably lay the groundwork for renewed 
conflict. In the aftermath of conflict, therefore, transitional societies must seek to break 
the impending cycle of violence and identify sustainable solutions through an appropriate 
form of transitional justice that will ensure the reconstruction of a society that adheres to 
the rule of law and that will not tolerate violations of human rights.  
 
The ultimate goal of transitional justice is to contend with the effects of mass atrocities 
committed during conflict in order to achieve justice and reconciliation, create 
sustainable peace, and prevent future conflict.15 Thus far, two theories of transitional 
justice have gained worldwide recognition—the retributive and the restorative justice 
theories. Each proposes a different approach to achieving the aims of transitional justice: 
justice and reconciliation.  Proponents of retributive justice argue in favour of individual 
                                                 
14 Nicole Laviolette ‘Command rape: Sexual violence, command Responsibility and the prosecution of 
superiors by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ 36 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law (1998): 95. 
15 Jeremy Sarkin ‘The tension between justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: politics, human rights, due 
process and the role of the gacaca courts in dealing with the genocide’ Journal of African Law (2001) 45 2: 





prosecutions and punishment, while proponents of restorative justice maintain that justice 
and reconciliation can only be achieved through dialogue and community participation.  
I.3 Aim 
 
There is, however, a more effective middle-ground approach to transitional justice. From 
the outset of the justice process (investigation of crimes) to the conclusion and beyond 
(e.g. provision of counselling and healthcare), a successful model of transitional justice 
must take the special needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence into 
consideration and at the same time, institute the necessary judicial and procedural 
safeguards. A comprehensive model, therefore, should be the ideal. It should contain 
elements of punishment of perpetrators in order to eradicate impunity for such crimes, but 
it should also heed the voices of the victims; involve the community, institute specialized 
measures to ensure the privacy and protection of the victims; and recognize that the 
transitional justice process for such crimes necessitates the sensitisation of personnel and 
also of the community in general.   
This dissertation will examine the challenges and limitations facing various mechanisms 
of transitional justice when dealing with crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, 
particularly in the Rwandan context. Having emerged from one of the worst mass 
atrocities in recent history, Rwanda has been faced with the ongoing challenge of 
identifying the appropriate transitional justice mechanisms. This dissertation will 
demonstrate, through an analysis of transitional justice mechanisms utilized in the 
Rwandan context, that the use of a single model of transitional justice—whether 
retributive or restorative—limits a society’s ability to sufficiently address crimes of 
sexual or gender-based violence and to satisfactorily ensure the realization of both justice 
and reconciliation. This study proposes that the more effective approach to transitional 
justice must be comprehensive in nature, incorporating key elements of both retributive 
and restorative justice, and taking into account the particular legal, political, and socio-
economic circumstances of the particular society. This is of paramount importance in the 





sustained, complex, and multi-layered, and therefore require specialized attention to 
ensure the achievement of the aims of transitional justice.   
I.4 Methodology 
 
To carry out my research, I will draw upon research reports, quantitative studies, texts, 
and articles on transitional justice, and on the nature, prevalence, and impact of crimes of 
sexual violence that were committed during conflict situations, particularly in Rwanda. I 
will also analyse relevant cases brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone. I will further analyse the domestic legislation in Rwanda including 
Rwanda’s Organic Laws concerning the prosecution of crimes of genocide and the 
establishment and functioning of the gacaca courts, and will draw upon studies 
conducted on the implementation of this legislation.    
I.5 Significance and Scope 
 
The significance of this dissertation is to illustrate that advancements in the international 
law concerning sexual and gender-based violence are essentially rendered useless without 
the institution of appropriate measures with which to implement the law. According to 
Copelon, ‘gender justice—which is among the most vehemently resisted aspects of 
international criminal law—is both profoundly revolutionary and one of the ultimate tests 
of universal justice.’16 This is because gender justice in its entirety refers not only to 
providing for gender-based crimes within the law, but also for instituting the necessary 
procedures to ensure that justice is realized for victims of these crimes. This includes 
ensuring that crimes of sexual and gender-based violence are considered equally as grave 
as other war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of genocide. In fact, Nowrojee 
asserts that  ‘[g]iven its routine widespread and systematic use, virtually every case 
coming before the international criminal courts should seek accountability for sexual 
                                                 
16 Rhonda Copelon ‘Gender crimes as war crimes: Integrating crimes against women into international 





violence crimes.’17 Instead, however, ‘[s]exual violence remains the invisible war crime. 
It remains a continuing challenge in the fight against invisibility to ensure that women's 
experiences are not ignored in this era of international justice.’18 Despite international 
legal developments, however, crimes of sexual violence continue to take place in Africa 
both within and outside the context of conflict situations. According to Amnesty 
International, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) at least 240,000 female 
civilians, girls and women were raped at the hands of various militiamen between 1999 
and 2005.19 The DRC’s ‘legacy of mass rape,’ as detailed in a Human Rights Watch 
Report, continues relatively unabated due to the ‘almost absolute levels of immunity’ 
attached to crimes of sexual violence.20 Moreover, tales of rape, sexual torture and sexual 
mutilation have emerged out of the situations of conflict and/or general instability in 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Most recently, a United Nations Human 
Rights Commission issued a report detailing accounts of various crimes against humanity 
occurring in the Sudan, including the establishment of rape camps in which women and 
girls are kept naked.21 The prevalence of these crimes to this day illustrates that there 
remains much to be done in order to ensure that such crimes are not ignored and allowed 
to remain invisible.  
 
The invisibility of such crimes goes far beyond the legal sphere, and permeates into the 
socio-economic sphere: victims of sexual violence require more than legal redress to 
ensure that justice is realized. Acts of sexual violence may continue to be rendered 
invisible if mechanisms are not put in place at the international and national levels to 
address such crimes. As long as steps are not taken to ensure the prevention of recurrence 
of such crimes, whether during conflict or in the aftermath of conflict, there is a very real 
                                                 
17  Binaifer Nowrojee ‘We can do better: investigating and prosecuting international crimes of sexual 
violence’ (2004). Available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/Rwanda/RwandaExecSum.pdf 
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/publications/papers/doBetter_en.php\ [Accessed on 5 September 
2006] at 2. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Rory Carroll ‘Eight years of darkness’ The Guardian 31 January 2005. 
20 Julianne  Kippenberg ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo—The legacy of mass rape: Prosecuting sexual 
violence in the Congo war,’ unpublished report cited in Cherie Booth and Max Du Plessis ‘The 
international criminal court and victims of sexual violence’ South African Journal of Criminal Justice 18 
(2005) 3: 241 at 242.  





danger that sexual violence will retain its status as the invisible crime. This issue will be 
explored in the context of post-genocide Rwanda, in order to illustrate that even when 
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence are provided for statutorily in both 
international and national law, the implementation process continues to be an uphill 
struggle. 22  In dealing with sexual and gender-based violence, Rwanda’s transitional 
justice mechanisms have faced numerous limitations and challenges and the country’s 
experience thus far demonstrates the need for transitional societies to institute a 




This dissertation comprises five chapters, including the present introductory chapter, 
which sets out the background of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, 
and the aim, and significance and scope, of the dissertation. Given the prevalence of 
sexual and gender-based violence throughout history, Chapter II illustrates the 
international legal response to such crimes by examining the statutory and jurisprudential 
developments made thus far in terms of international law. The aim of this chapter is to 
illustrate the codification of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence at the 
international level and to note that despite the significance of these developments, the 
aims and goals of transitional justice cannot be met without establishing the appropriate 
mechanisms through which to implement these laws. Chapter III sets out the principles of 
transitional justice and outlines the arguments for and against a strictly retributive or a 
strictly restorative approach to transitional justice. This chapter establishes that in order 
to attain the goals of transitional justice, a country must employ a comprehensive model 
that incorporates key aspects of both restorative and retributive justice, that bridges the 
gap between international and domestic law, and that takes into consideration the specific 
circumstances of the post-conflict society in question.  Chapter IV provides an illustration 
of how a post conflict society contends with crimes of sexual and gender-based violence 
by drawing on Rwanda’s transitional justice experience thus far, outlining the 
                                                 
22 Human Rights Watch Struggling to survive: barriers to justice for rape victims in Rwanda’ (2004); 
Binaifer Nowrojee ‘Your justice is too slow’: will the ICTR fail Rwanda’s rape victims?’ (2004). Available 





developments achieved and the challenges faced by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, the national courts, and the traditional gacaca courts as pertains to crimes of 
sexual and gender-based violence. Finally, Chapter V concludes that in order to ensure 
that crimes of sexual and gender-based violence do not remain invisible and/or 
subordinate to other gross violations of human rights law, transitional justice mechanisms 
must institute specialized measures, and take into account the society’s historical, 
political, and socio-economic circumstances in order to realize true justice, effect 
sustainable reconciliation, eradicate a culture of impunity, and ensure the prevention of 
future violations. 
 
It has been established in this chapter that sexual and gender-based violence are part and 
parcel of conflict, and have been so throughout history. Despite the frequency and 
prevalence of the use of sexual violence as a weapon, however, crimes of sexual violence 
against women and girls whether during or in the aftermath of conflict, have been 
shrouded in silence thereby rendering them essentially invisible throughout history. The 
following chapter will discuss the status of sexual and gender-based violence within the 
context of international law, outlining the statutory and jurisprudential developments that 











Sexual and gender-based violence has been intrinsically intertwined with conflict 
situations throughout history. Rape and other forms of sexual violence continue to be 
used as weapons of war by official armies as well as by militia groups and rebel forces. 
However, as established in Chapter I, despite the prevalence of sexual and gender-based 
violence during conflict situations over decades, these human rights violations have not 
received much international attention particularly in the legal arena until recent years, and 
even then, the criminalisation of such acts has been a long and arduous process. This 
chapter will initially explore the shortcomings inherent in the legal processes regarding 
failure to prosecute conflict-related crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. The 
chapter will thereafter examine the international legal developments that have culminated 
in existing definitions of, and have established individual criminal responsibility for, 
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the 
criminalisation of acts of conflict related sexual and gender-based violence thereby 
establishing the international legal context for the transitional justice process. 
II.2 International law in the context of sexual violence 
 
Contributing to the conspiracy of silence surrounding crimes of sexual and gender-based 
violence are the notions of rape as simply a private act or as an attack on a woman’s 
personal honour. These notions have been prevalent throughout history and have ensured 
that acts of sexual violence that take place during internal or international conflicts have 
remained largely ignored, prompting current various experts to refer to sexual violence as 
‘the invisible crime.’ 23  It is important to note that even though individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity was first established during the 
post-World War II prosecutions held at the International Military Tribunals (IMT), rape 
                                                 





was not included in the charter establishing the tribunals, nor was it charged as a separate 
offence in either the Nuremburg or the Tokyo tribunals.24 Yet rape and sexual slavery 
were prevalent during the war, as illustrated by the abduction and transportation of over 
two hundred thousand girls and women of non-Japanese origin from Japanese occupied 
territories to rape camps known as ‘comfort stations.’25  Although knowledge of the 
existence of these camps must have been fairly widespread due to the incredibly large 
number of women and young girls that was targeted, there were no subsequent 
prosecutions for rape and/or sexual slavery.  
 
Even when accusations of sexual violence were introduced in the Tokyo tribunal, ‘they 
were rejected as the judge found it too difficult to prove that the women had not given 
their consent to sexual intercourse.’26 Copelon correctly attributes the failure to prosecute 
these acts to the ‘privatisation of sexual violence in patriarchal culture.’27 In the rare 
instance that rape, for example, was recognized as a war crime, it was done implicitly so 
and viewed less as an attack on a person, as an attack against the honour of a State or an 
ethnic group.28 This is evident in the 1949 Geneva Conventions in which crimes of sexual 
violence were not included in Common Article 3 which provides for minimum measures 
of protection during armed conflict. Rather, within the scope of the Convention, they 
were categorized as ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment’29 or as an ‘attack against a woman’s honour.’30 In addition, within 
the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, crimes of sexual violence are 
considered solely in terms of honour and dignity.31  
                                                 
24  Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major War Criminals, appended to 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 
1945, London, as amended Protocol to Agreement and Charter, 6 October 1945, 82 UNTS 279, 57 Stat. 
1544. Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm [Accessed on 12 December 
2006). See also Lyth Supra note 1 at 4 and Copelon Supra note 16 at 220. 
25 Copelon Supra note 16 at 220. 
26 Lyth Supra note 1 at 4.  
27 Copelon Supra note 16 at 220.  
28 Ibid., at 221. 
29 Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949. 
30  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention) 12 August 1949 at Article 27. 
31 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of 






Defining sexual violence merely as a question of honour results in the separation of such 
crimes from other grave breaches of human rights law and, as such, creates a most 
profound obstacle to ensuring gender justice throughout history. Not only has this 
definition led to the relegation of such crimes to second-class status, but it has also led to 
categorization of such crimes as only moral crimes,32 thereby ensuring their exclusion 
from the field of international criminal law for decades. According to Copelon, ‘[i]f not 
invisible, [sexual violence] was trivialized; if not trivialized, it was considered a private 
matter or justified as an inevitable by-product of war, the necessary reward for fighting 
men.’33 Whatever the case, although sexual violence has always been part and parcel of 
conflict situations, whether international or internal, it has also always been deemed to be 
of little or no importance, publicly.  
 
This view of crimes of sexual violence as tertiary war crimes or as private acts negates 
the impact of these acts and has contributed to the general culture of impunity 
surrounding sex crimes at the international level. Consequently, despite the fact that acts 
of sexual violence tend to be included in and occur contemporaneously with acts of 
slavery, torture and genocide, they have generally not been accorded the same gravity as 
other war crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes of torture.34 Crimes of sexual and 
gender-based violence, however, are not in any way secondary to other violations of 
international human rights law, and because of the contexts within which they are 
perpetrated—environments charged with hostility, intimidation, brutal violence—they are 
far from private in nature and are in fact harnessed as weapons of war. Regardless, it has 
taken decades for such crimes to receive recognition in the sphere of international law. 
 
Within the last decade, developments at the international level, in terms of the institution 
of transitional justice mechanisms, legislation and jurisprudence, have contributed to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of the 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II) 8 June 1977at  Article 4(2) (e). 
32 Rhonda Copelon ‘Surfacing gender: re-engraving crimes against women in humanitarian law’ (1994) 
Cited in Lyth Supra note 1 at 5. 
33 Copelon Supra note 16 at 220. 





establishment of international criminal responsibility for sexual and gender-based 
violence. In the 1990s, the situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda drew 
international attention to the gross violations of human rights that occurred during 
campaigns of genocide and ethnic cleansing. With the use of rape camps in Yugoslavia, 
for example, the existence of sexual violence as a weapon of armed conflict could no 
longer be ignored by the international community.35 According to Simon Chesterman, the 
events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia illustrated that the purpose of sexual 
aggression against women was to serve as a horrific public display of domination where 
the ‘rape of the woman’s body symbolically represents the rape of the community 
itself.’36 Throughout the 1990s, various United Nations World Conferences were held, 
from Vienna in 1993 to Cairo in 1994 to Beijing in 1995, in which the principles for 
codifying international law on violence against women began to be prioritised and 
recognized.37 These principles eventually contributed to the landmark decisions made by 
the United Nations ad-hoc Tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia [ICTY] and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]) .38 In 
1996, for example, the ICTR made history in Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu 39 
(hereafter, the Akayesu case), which marked the first time an international criminal 
tribunal convicted an individual for genocide and international crimes of sexual violence. 
This decision ultimately informed subsequent definitions of crimes of sexual violence 
and represented the international commitment to prosecuting crimes of sexual violence 
which has been enshrined in numerous international instruments, including the statutes of 
the ‘hybrid courts,’ 40 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which 
provides for crimes of sexual violence as genocide, war crimes, and as crimes against 
humanity.  
II.3 Development of International Mechanisms of Transitional Justice 
 
                                                 
35 See Tadeusz Mazowiecki Supra note 2.  
36 Simon Chesterman ‘Never again … and again: Law, order, and the gender of war crimes in Bosnia and 
beyond’ Yale Journal of International Law (1997) 22: 299 at 327-8. 
37 Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf Supra note 12 at 91 
38 Ibid.  
39 Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu ICTR (Trial Chamber) Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998). 
Available at www.ictr.org [Accessed on 23 September 2006] (hereafter, Akayesu case). 






There are various mechanisms through which these developments in international law are 
implemented including ad-hoc tribunals, a permanent international court, and ‘hybrid 
courts’. Societies emerging from conflicts wherein gross human rights violations were 
perpetrated on a massive scale are usually left unable to address these violations strictly 
at the national level. This is due most often to a previous culture of impunity in terms of 
such violations, lack of appropriate infrastructure, an overwhelming number of accused 
to be investigated and prosecuted, and inadequate laws. International courts and tribunals 
play a significant role in the enforcement of international human rights law where 
countries are either unwilling or unable to try suspected perpetrators of human rights 
violations. As such, in addition to national courts, these international mechanisms have 
been relied on by post-conflict societies in recent years in order to establish individual 
criminal accountability. It will be necessary, therefore, to briefly describe examples of 
international mechanisms of transitional justice so as to establish the conceptual legal 
framework within which crimes of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence are 
addressed 
II.3.1 Ad-hoc tribunals: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) 
 
In response to two of the most horrific conflicts in recent history, the United Nations 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1993 and 1994 respectively. These 
ad-hoc tribunals have been the first international mechanisms of transitional justice to 
include crimes of sexual violence in their statutes as crimes, as opposed to violations of 
honour. However, the most significant developments made by the tribunals have been in 
terms of jurisprudence. In the case of Rwanda, the ICTR was established, as per the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of November 8 1994, in order to 
prosecute ‘persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed on the territory of Rwanda, and the prosecution of Rwandan 
citizens responsible for the genocide and other such violations of international law 





December 1994.’41 The inclusion in the mandate of the tribunal’s contributions to peace 
and reconciliation is what distinguishes it from the mandate of the ICTY, which makes 
no mention of the tribunal’s role in facilitating reconciliation.42 The success or failure of 
the ICTR in achieving this goal will be examined in further detail in Chapter IV when 
examining the tribunal’s strengths and weaknesses particularly concerning crimes of 
sexual and gender-based violence. Although the ICTY will not be examined in detail for 
present purposes, it is crucial to note that as the first international tribunal established 
since the Nuremburg and Tokyo IMTs, it holds the distinction of also being the first 
tribunal to address gender-based crimes.   
II.3.2 Permanent International Court: International Criminal Court 
(ICC) 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a permanent judicial body, established by the 
Rome Statute of 17 July 1998, which entered into force on July 1 2002. Within the 
international community, the issue of creating a permanent criminal court had been under 
consideration since the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1949) and in 1948, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations directed the International law Commission to examine 
the possibility of creating a permanent international criminal court.43 In the 50 years 
between then and the year the Rome Statute was adopted, the field of international 
criminal law advanced significantly, as illustrated by the Statute itself. In fact, according 
to Antonio Cassese, ‘[i]t is the enactment of the ICC Statute which represents the 
pinnacle of the institutionalisation and universalisation of measures for the enforcement 
of international humanitarian law.’44 The Rome Statute is the first international treaty to 
recognize sexual and gender-based violence as grave breaches of international law, 
thereby contributing immeasurably to the advancement of international human rights law.  
 
                                                 
41 See PICT website Supra note 13 and The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) at 
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42  Payam Akhavan ‘The international criminal tribunal for Rwanda: the politics and pragmatics of 
punishment’ The American Journal of International Law (1996) 90: 501-510. 
43 Antonio Cassese ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: International military tribunals to the international criminal 
court’ in A. Cassese, P Gaeta and J Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a 
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II.4 Statutory and Jurisprudential Developments 
 
 
With regard to the ad-hoc tribunals, despite the fact that only a fraction of the cases have 
actually been prosecuted at the ICTR and the ICTY, significant jurisprudential progress 
has been made in terms of crimes of sexual violence, reflecting the key statutory 
developments contained in the constitutive documents of the tribunals. According to 
Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, the ad-hoc tribunals ‘have raised the standards of 
accountability for crimes of sexual violence against women’ and their judgments have 
‘set historic precedents in prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide’.45 In the ICTR’s landmark Akayesu case, the court broadened the previously 
restrictive definition of the crime of rape under international law and defined it as 
involving ‘a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive’46 that may or may not involve sexual intercourse. 
Following this precedent, the ICTY attempted to further elaborate on the above definition 
in both the Furundzija case 47  and the Kunarac case. 48  The latest decision on the 
definition of rape was made in Prosecutor v Muhimana in which the Trial Chamber of 
the ICTR harmonized the definitions and elements of rape established in Akayesu and 
Kunarac/Furundzija.49  
 
The Akayesu case was the first case heard before the ICTR and, because of the 
historically momentous findings made in this case, it is lauded as possibly ‘the most 
important decision rendered thus far in the history of women’s jurisprudence.’ 50 
Subsequent decisions in both ad-hoc tribunals have resulted in a considerable body of 
                                                 
45See Rehn and Johnson-Sirleaf Supra note 12. Note that the ICTY and ICTR have upheld convictions of 
rape and other forms of sexual violence as instruments of genocide (Akayesu), crimes against humanity 
(Akayesu, Kunarac), war crimes (Celebici, Furundzija), forms of torture (Kunarac, Celebici, Furundzija), 
means of persecution (Kvocka), and forms of enslavement (Kunarac). 
46 Akayesu case Supra note 39 at para 598. 
47 Prosecutor v Furundzija ICTY (Trial Chamber II) Case no. IT-95-17/1T (10 December 1998) at para. 
185. Available at www.un.org/icty [Accessed 1 September 2006] (hereafter, Furundzija case). 
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Prosecutor v Kunarac ICTY (Trial Chamber II) Case no IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) at para 460. 
Available at www.un.org/icty [Accessed 1 September 2006] (hereafter, Kunarac case). 
49 Prosecutor v Muhimana, ICTR (Trial Chamber) Case no ICTR-95-1-I (28 April 2005). 
50 Kelly Askin ‘Women’s issues in international criminal law: Recent developments and the potential 
contribution of the ICC’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: The Role 





jurisprudence that recognize rape and other forms of sexual violence as grave breaches of 
international criminal law. This jurisprudence, in turn, proved to be a most important 
foundation for the codification of sexual violence as part of the substantive jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court.’51 The ICTR’s most recent and perhaps notorious case 
concerning sexual and gender-based violence is that of Prosecutor v Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko in which Rwanda’s former Minister for the Family and Women’s 
Development is standing trial on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.52 Nyiramasuhuko is the first woman in the history of international law to be 
charged, specifically, with rape as a crime against humanity for her active encouragement 
of the rape of Tutsi women at the hand of the Interahamwe militia.53  Her indictment and 
subsequent trial reflect the monumental leaps and bounds that have occurred within the 
international legal sphere enabling the establishment of individual criminal responsibility 
for conflict and sexual based violence. These developments have ultimately resulted in 
the clarification and legal codification of the definition of rape, as discussed above, 
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence have also been enshrined as crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  
 
II.4.1 Sexual Violence as a Crime of Genocide 
 
Genocide was initially defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, and is considered a crime of customary international law. Acts 
of genocide are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, by killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about 
destruction of the group in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births 
or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.54 The statutes of the ad-
hoc tribunals provide for genocide in Articles 2 and 4 of the ICTR and the ICTY 
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respectively, and include in their definition a list of punishable genocidal acts. In the 
Akayesu case, for example, one of the most significant contributions made by the ICTR 
was the finding that rape can amount to genocide. In this landmark decision, the Tribunal 
found that the accused had the requisite mental element (mens rea) to commit genocide, 
which he had exhibited through supervising, enabling and encouraging the systematic 
rape of Tutsi women. The tribunal held that the systematic rape aimed at Tutsi women 
was part of the campaign to mobilize the Hutu against the Tutsi, and the sexual violence 
itself was aimed at destroying the spirit, will to live, or will to procreate, of the Tutsi 
group.55 The effect of this decision is later reflected in the Rome Statute which provides 
for Genocide in Article 6 as a ‘serious bodily or mental harm,’ which is clarified in the 
Statute’s Elements of Crime to include acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman 
or degrading treatment. This is most significant because it recognizes rape, sexual 
violence, and sexual torture alongside other egregious violations of human rights that 
constitute crimes of genocide.  
 
II.4.2 Sexual Violence as a War Crime 
 
In addition to categorizing rape and sexual violence as crimes of genocide, legal 
developments have enabled such crimes to fall under the category of war crimes. War 
crimes constitute serious violations of both customary and conventional international 
humanitarian law and include grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. In terms of sexual and gender-based violence, Article 27 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention States that women should be protected against ‘rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault’ in times of war56 . The Statute for the 
International Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY Statute) provides for 
war crimes in Articles 2 and 3, and ICTY case law have further consolidated the 
definition of rape and other forms of sexual violence as serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. In the Prosecutor v Furundzija, for example, a paramilitary leader was 
convicted of outrages upon personal dignity and torture by means of rape (a violation of 
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Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, constituting a serious violation of the 
laws or customs of war) for verbally interrogating a woman in front of laughing soldiers 
while his colleague physically raped her.57 The Statute of the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda (hereafter, ICTR Statute) further defines rape as a war crime in Article 4, which 
provides for the prosecution of violations of Common Article 3 and of Additional 
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.58 Crimes of sexual violence are further clarified 
as war crimes in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, ‘in particular when committed as part of a 
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’59 Article 8 includes 
in its definition of war crimes ‘committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment’60 and ‘committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy…, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions’ in both 
international61 and internal62 conflicts. Furthermore, sexual violence constitutes torture as 
a war crime, provided that the sexual attack occurs during armed conflict for one of the 
traditional purposes of torture: extracting information or a confession, punishment, 
intimidation or coercion, or in order to discriminate.63 This comprehensive definition 
provides for a wide variety of crimes of sexual violence, committed during both internal 
and international conflict, to be prosecuted as war crimes: a noteworthy development, the 
significance of which is mirrored in the further categorization of such crimes as crimes 
against humanity.   
 
II.4.3 Sexual Violence as a Crime against Humanity 
 
In order to constitute a crime against humanity, acts of sexual violence must be 
widespread or systematic, with knowledge of the attack, and can thereby be prosecuted 
whether they occur during or in the aftermath of conflict. Both statutes of the ad-hoc 
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tribunals provide for rape and sexual violence as crimes against humanity in both internal 
and international conflict in Articles 5 and 3 of the ICTY and the ICTR respectively.64 
Rape is explicitly listed among the crimes against humanity within the jurisdictions of 
both ad-hoc tribunals, and in the cases of Akayesu and Prosecutor v Kunarac,65  the 
Tribunals convicted the accused of rape as a crime against humanity when the crimes 
were committed during the course of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. 
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber drew comparisons between rape and torture as defined in 
the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (Torture Convention), holding that: 
 
Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, 
degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or 
destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal 
dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.66 
 
Equating rape with torture was a key step towards consolidating the legal status of rape 
and sexual violence as crimes against humanity. Building upon this step, Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute incorporates the principle that sexual violence must be seen as part of other 
egregious forms of violence, such as enslavement and torture.67  The Statute defines 
crimes against humanity as acts of violence committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack68 
and this includes not only rape, but sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity.69 It is important to note that the Statute provides for both sexual slavery and 
enslavement as a crime against humanity, with the latter being defined as ‘the exercise of 
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the 
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
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children.’70The inclusion of the latter caveat in the definition allows for prosecution of 
crimes against women that may or may not be sexual in nature, such as situations in 
which women and children are kidnapped and held in order to serve as labourers or as 
foot soldiers, as was the case in Sierra Leone.  
 
In addition, the Statute’s definition of torture as a crime against humanity is so broad that 
it allows for acts of sexual violence to be included within its definition. For the purposes 
of the crime against humanity of torture, the perpetrator must have inflicted severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons who were in the 
perpetrator’s custody or under his control. 71  The pain or suffering must have been 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population, and the perpetrator must have been aware that the conduct was part of such 
an attack or intended it to be such.72 This broad definition of torture widens the sphere 
within which crimes of sexual and gender-based violence can be prosecuted, and this is 
significant because it prevents such crimes from falling between the cracks due to lack of 
a specific legal definition.  
 
Such broad and cross cutting definitions enable prosecutors to charge perpetrators of 
crimes of sexual violence with the cumulative offences of torture (as a crime against 
humanity or a war crime), and rape or other sexual violence (such as enslavement and 
sexual slavery) as prohibited under the Rome Statute.73 The broad definitions contained 
in the Statute have opened the door to the possibility of wider prosecutions of 
international crimes of sexual violence, and as such, the ICC has been heralded as 
marking ‘a new era of international justice and accountability for women.’74 Clearly, the 
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exhaustive list of sexual violence crimes provided for in the Rome Statute represents an 
important step forward for the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence.75  
 
II.4.4 Procedural Developments  
 
In addition to the substantial provisions listed above, the statue also provides for 
procedural safeguards aimed specifically at prosecution of crimes of sexual and gender-
based violence. The Statute recognizes that in order to ensure justice is realized, the 
composition of the court must be taken into account, and special measures must be 
instituted to provide for victims and/or witnesses. Although, all the statutes of 
international courts and tribunals contain provisions regarding the composition of the 
bench, Article 36 of the Rome Statute, which deals with the qualifications, nomination 
and election of judges, sets out further requirements, not previously seen.76  In other 
international criminal tribunals, it is not a requirement for the judges to have actual 
experience in criminal law. The Rome Statute, however, requires that all judges have 
courtroom experience in criminal law and procedure.77 Moreover, the statute stipulates 
that in the selection of judges, States parties shall take into account the need for 
representation of the principle legal systems of the world, equitable geographical 
representation, and an appropriate gender balance.78 Even more significantly, in terms of 
dealing with crimes of sexual violence, the statute requires that judges have legal 
expertise on specific issues, including violence against women and children. 79  The 
significance of such provisions reflects the fact that ‘[w]ho interprets the law is at least as 
important as who makes the law, if not more so’80—a concept that will be explored 
further in Chapter IV in the context of the ICTR. Article 36 represents a development in 
the international legal arena towards an understanding the crimes of sexual and gender-
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based violence require illustrates the statute’s commitment to ensure crimes of sexual 
violence are effectively prosecuted.  
 
In addition to the provision concerning the composition of the bench, the Rome Statute’s 
rules of procedure guarantee witness protection for women who testify. Under Article 
68(2) the Court may, as an exception to the principle of public hearings laid down in the 
statute, conduct closed hearings or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or 
other means in order to protect victims or witnesses. Furthermore, a Victim and 
Witnesses Unit (VWU) within the ICC may advise the prosecutor and the Court on 
appropriate protective measures, security arrangements, counselling and assistance.81 The 
VWU calls explicitly for staff ‘with expertise in trauma, including trauma related to 
crimes of sexual violence.’ 82  Moreover, in a significant advancement, victims may 
receive reparations through compensation, restitution and rehabilitation, which may take 
the form of communal reconstruction and healing programs.83 Finally, the ICC has gone 
another step further by providing for a Trust Fund for Victims, as per Article 79. This is 
particularly relevant for those victims of sexual violence who continue to live with the 
psychological and physical scars and illnesses incurred through rape and other forms of 
sexual violence. The existence of this provision is evidence of the recognition that in 
order for justice to be served, it is not enough simply to prosecute perpetrators of these 
gross violations of human rights. A Trust Fund could mean relative independence for a 
woman who has been left widowed and it could help provide for anti-retroviral drugs for 
those infected with HIV/AIDS as a consequence of rape. These procedural provisions 
recognize the multifaceted and continuous effects of crimes of conflict-related sexual and 
gender-based violence, and establish the obligation of the court to take victims’ rights 
into account.  
 
The significance of these developments is that the crimes recognized by the ICC Statute, 
including the gender-specific offences, might ‘take on a life of their own as an 
authoritative and largely customary Statement of international humanitarian and criminal 
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law, and ... become a model for national laws to be enforced under the principle of 
universality of jurisdiction.’84 The Rome Statute embodies the progress made over the 
past five decades in terms of achieving gender justice, and provides the opportunity for 
the ICC to make a significant contribution to further jurisprudential development. The 
Statute has incorporated developments made by the ad-hoc tribunals and—in terms of 
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence—has set a precedent for subsequent 
international mechanisms.  
 
II.5 Recent Developments: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, A Hybrid 
Court 
 
In addition to the above statutory and jurisprudential developments, the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) recently demonstrated the international 
community’s resolve to strengthen mechanisms at both the national and international 
levels in order to end impunity for crimes of sexual violence.85 The cumulative effects of 
these developments is that rape and sexual violence have finally been recognized as 
‘weapons of war’ and not as private matters or as a question of personal or State honour. 
Such crimes, therefore, can no longer be considered as by-products of conflict. The 
brutally violent, widespread, and systematic acts of rape and sexual violence so central to 
campaigns of ethnic cleansing and genocide in recent years have effectively put an end to 
the privatisation of sexual violence, thrusting it into the public sphere. 86  The legal 
developments discussed above demonstrate not only an acknowledgment both nationally 
and internationally of crimes of sexual violence, but also a general willingness to address 
such crimes in the legal arena.   
 
Furthermore, additional transitional justice mechanisms have been created inspired by 
and based upon the developments made by the ad-hoc tribunals and by the International 
Criminal Court. Following along the path already forged by the ad hoc tribunals, 
                                                 
84 Theodor Meron, ‘Crimes under the jurisdiction of the international criminal court’ in Herman A. M. von 
Hebel, Johan G. Lammers and Jolien Schukking (eds.)  Reflections on the International Criminal Court 
(1999) 47-48. 
85  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). S/RES/1325 (2000) Available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html [Accessed 12 September 2006]. 





internationalised or “hybrid”87 courts have been jointly established over the years by the 
United Nations and national transitional governments in order to deal with specific 
conflict situations. These courts are essentially custom-made to suit each country’s 
particular post-conflict circumstances and include the Crimes Panels of the District Court 
of Dili in East Timor, the “Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo, and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. As with the ad hoc tribunals, the aim of these hybrid 
courts is to impose punitive sanctions on individuals who have violated international law 
and to contribute to the restoration of peace and stability in the countries and regions 
affected. What sets this type of internationalised criminal court apart from the other 
mechanisms discussed above is the fact that it applies both international and domestic 
substantive and procedural law, which is reflected in its unique legal features.88 Unlike 
the ad-hoc tribunals, therefore, these courts do not take precedence over the domestic 
courts of States in which they are established. This fact is of key significance when 
establishing the connection between international and domestic law, particularly in the 
context of implementation.  
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘Special Court’), for example, was created in the 
aftermath of the protracted civil war that took place in Sierra Leone from 1991-2001, 
resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and the displacement of more than 2 million 
people (well over one-third of the population) many of whom became refugees in 
neighbouring countries.89 The Special Court was established by an agreement between 
the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1315 (2000) of August 14, 2000. Its mandate is to prosecute persons who bear 
the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. 
Such persons include those leaders who, in committing such crimes, threatened the 
establishment and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.90 In addition the 
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Special Court has competence to prosecute any transgressions by peacekeepers and 
related personnel.91  
 
Pursuant to the advancements made by both the ad-hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute, 
the Special Court Statute also specifically provides for crimes of sexual and gender-based 
violence. Included in the Special Court’s Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity 
are ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of 
sexual violence’ when committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack’ against 
civilians.92 In addition, crimes of sexual violence that constitute war crimes include ‘rape, 
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.’93 Illustrative of its hybrid nature, 
the Statute also gives the Court the mandate to prosecute crimes that fall under Sierra 
Leonean law, including ‘offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children Act, 1926.’94  
 
In terms of procedure, the Statute follows the example of the Rome Statute by providing 
for the engendering of the investigation and prosecution phases of crimes of sexual 
violence. Article 15 (4) provides that given ‘the nature of the crimes committed and the 
particular sensitivities of girls, young women, and children [sic] victims of rape, sexual 
assault, abduction and slavery of all kinds, due consideration should be given in the 
appointment of staff to the employment of prosecutors and investigators experienced in 
gender-related crimes and juvenile justice.’95 In a similar vein, Article 16 (4) requires that 
the staff within the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the court ‘include experts in trauma, 




The developments outlined in this chapter illustrate the efforts that have been made at the 
international level to establish criminal responsibility for acts of sexual and gender-based 
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violence during conflict, whether internal or international. Consequently, the general 
outcome of these developments is that such crimes are no longer considered invisible in 
the legal sphere, and are in fact treated with the same magnitude as other gross human 
rights violations enshrined in international law.  The significance of these developments 
cannot be emphasized enough, for they have created a space for sexual and gender-based 
violence within the international legal sphere, thereby consolidating the status of such 
acts as violations of international human rights law. However, the establishment of such 
laws and mechanisms do not necessarily ensure that crimes of sexual and gender-based 
violence are effectively dealt with. In fact, the full impact of these developments can only 
truly be judged in the context of the implementation process at the domestic level. The 
mechanisms and laws described above, therefore, are essentially ineffective without an 
appropriate approach to implementation that ensures the realization and sustainability of 
the principles enshrined in their statutes and reflected in their jurisprudence. This is 
particularly significant in the context of transitional societies emerging from conflicts 
characterized by gross human rights violations, particularly sexual and gender-based 
violence. The following chapter will outline and analyse transitional justice theories and 
models of both retributive and restorative justice, and will propose that any strategy 
employed by a State in transition, must include elements of both models of transitional 











The key statutory and jurisprudential developments outlined in Chapter II provide the 
international legal context within which crimes of sexual and gender-based violence can 
be addressed. These developments, however, are essentially rendered ineffectual if there 
are no proper mechanisms in place with which to implement them.  In the case of 
transitional societies, the challenge facing each State is how to incorporate developments 
made at the international level into domestic law. Conflict situations tend to be 
characterized by lack of rule of law and a culture of impunity. This is evident in countries 
like Rwanda and Sierra Leone, where the crimes committed against women and girls 
were so rampant, systematic, and widespread. The present chapter examines the possible 
approaches transitional societies can take to implement the legal developments discussed 
in the previous chapter. It sets out the principles of transitional justice and outlines the 
theoretical debate concerning whether or not a strictly retributive or a strictly restorative 
approach to transitional justice is most effective. The chapter will establish that there are 
significant limitations to employing a purely retributive or a purely restorative approach 
to transitional justice in post-conflict societies. As such, a country must employ a 
comprehensive model of transitional justice that incorporates key aspects of both 
restorative and retributive justice, bridges the gap between international and domestic 
law, and takes into consideration the specific circumstances of the post-conflict society in 
question. 
III.2 What is Transitional Justice? 
 
In international law, the field of transitional justice addresses the effects of conflict in 
post-conflict or transitional societies in order to create sustainable peace and to prevent 
future conflict. 97  Essentially, ‘transitional justice refers to the short-term and often 
temporary judicial and non-judicial mechanisms and processes that address the legacy of 
                                                 





human rights abuses and violence during a society’s transition away from conflict….’98 
The brand of justice to be applied in a post-conflict society is especially relevant in the 
context of societies where gross violations of human rights have been committed on a 
massive scale, not only by authority figures, but also by members of the community at 
large. Relying primarily on ensuring the human rights of victims, transitional justice 
basically entails confronting the past in order to reconstruct the present and fortify the 
future. It  
…relies on international law to make the case that States 
undergoing transitions are faced with certain legal obligations, 
including halting ongoing human rights abuses, investigating past 
crimes, identifying those responsible for human rights violations, 
imposing sanctions on those responsible, providing reparations to 
victims, preventing future abuses, preserving and enhancing peace, 
and fostering individual and national reconciliation.99  
 
Transitional justice, therefore, embodies a State’s attempts to achieve both justice and 
reconciliation within a society that is in a continuous State of recovery, while 
simultaneously repairing the fragmented social and institutional fabric.  
 
It can be argued that the values of justice and reconciliation appear to be diametrically 
opposed,100 since the pursuit of one may, in some cases, inherently contradict the pursuit 
of the other. Justice and reconciliation, however, are both continual processes with the 
mutual goal of identifying the tears in the societal fabric that have been caused by crimes 
committed during and in the aftermath of conflict situations, and of further identifying (or 
in some cases, creating) the appropriate mechanisms with which to mend these tears, and 
restore the society to one that is able to prevent future conflict and effect reconciliation. 
The goals of transitional justice include: 
 
 addressing, and attempting to heal, divisions in society that arise as a result of 
human rights violations; 
 bringing closure and healing the wounds of individuals and society, 
particularly through ‘truth telling; 
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 providing justice to victims and accountability for perpetrators; 
 creating an accurate historical record for society; 
 restoring the rule of law; 
 reforming institutions to promote democratisation and human rights; 
 ensuring that human rights violations are not repeated; and 
 promoting co-existence and sustainable peace.101 
 
The ultimate goal of transitional justice, therefore, is the realization of national and 
societal reconciliation through justice. In attempting to heal the wounds of conflict, 
justice and reconciliation are inextricably intertwined. Since reconciliation is a process, it 
can refer to anything from peaceful co-existence to dialogue, apology and forgiveness 
and, subsequently, healing.102 The point of reconciliation is not to restore the situation to 
what it once was, but rather to reconstruct societies through achieving the goals such as 
those listed above. Reconciliation, therefore, is not an end result, as much as it is a 
continual process involving both judicial and extra-judicial mechanisms and efforts. How 
a post-conflict country chooses to embark on this process depends largely on the type of 
conflict from which it is emerging. As such, countries ‘make their choices according to 
the contexts of their transitions, taking into account the seriousness of the crimes 
committed and the resources available to deal with these issues.’103 Sarkin maintains that: 
 
Broadly speaking, options available to a new democratic society 
include (1) criminal sanctions; (2) non-criminal sanctions; and (3) the 
rehabilitation of the society. Usually, the path chosen takes into account 
three goals: truth, justice, and reconciliation. The balance struck 
between these goals is determined to a large extent by the type of 
transition.104 
 
Essentially, therefore, the path to reconciliation and societal reconstruction is unique to 
each post-conflict society, depending on numerous contributing factors.  
 
Within the field of transitional justice, questions are raised as to whether justice should be 
retributive or restorative in nature; whether, for example, transitional societies should 
focus on conducting individual prosecutions, establishing truth and reconciliation 
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commissions, or utilizing traditional courts. The challenge facing transitional 
governments is that they ‘must think creatively about building institutions that bring 
justice to the past, while at the same time demonstrate a commitment that justice will 
form a bedrock of governance in the present and the future.’105 In a transitional society 
emerging out of mass violence, therefore, justice represents a ‘path between too much 
memory and too much forgetting.’106 It is imperative to retain the memory of conflict 
through acknowledgement of the atrocities that were committed. Similarly, it is 
imperative to institute measures that address such atrocities in a manner that ensures they 
can never again occur. 
III.3 Retributive Justice Model  
 
One of the first instances of transitional justice at work were the Nuremburg trials that 
took place after the Second World War, and were rooted in the justice paradigm107—in 
which individuals were identified and prosecuted according to international law. The aim 
of ‘retributive justice’ is to establish individual criminal responsibility through 
prosecution. The key underlying principle of retributive justice is that an individual who 
commits violations of human rights should be sufficiently punished in a court of law, or 
at the very least be made to confess in a public forum and seek forgiveness.108 This is 
based on the Kantian notion of just desert, which posits that, in every society, each 
individual enjoys the benefits of rule of law. When an offender commits a wrongdoing, 
they deprive the victim(s) of their benefits while undeservedly gaining their own 
benefits. 109  Punishment, therefore, ‘removes the underserved benefit by imposing a 
penalty that in some sense balances the harm inflicted by the offense [sic].’110 It is hoped 
that through criminal prosecution, future violations may be deterred and justice will be 
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realized for the victims of these violations.111  Advocates of the retributive approach 
believe, therefore, that punishment is necessary to establish accountability, to act as a 
deterrent to future crimes, to ensure resistance to a culture of impunity, and to enable 
future co-existence of perpetrators and victims. A final element of the retributive justice 
model is restitution, which ensures either recovery of losses or compensation for the 
victims.  This usually takes the form of monetary compensation to the victims either by 
the offender or on behalf of the State.112 
 
Proponents of prosecution feel that it is a necessary route to ensure social reconciliation, 
because ‘society cannot forgive what it cannot punish.’113 By singling out and punishing 
perpetrators of human rights violations, culpability is individualized, thereby preventing 
the targeting and scapegoating of a particular group. This is particularly significant in 
post-conflict societies in which one group (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) has been the 
subject of persecution at the hands of another. Proponents of the retributive justice model 
maintain that individual prosecutions serve to demonstrate to the society at large that the 
legal and political systems in place are indeed functional and efficient, thereby restoring 
faith in the administrative and judicial systems. 114  Diane Orentlicher maintains that 
prosecutions are a must in transitional justice because international law imposes an 
obligation on governments to prosecute a prior regime’s human rights violations, arguing 
that prosecutions are the most effective way with which to address past atrocities.115 
Other proponents of retributive justice posit that ‘prosecution makes possible the sort of 
retribution seen by most societies as an appropriate communal response to criminal 
conduct.’ 116  While containing elements of both justice and reconciliation, retributive 
justice tends to place the emphasis more on the former than the latter. In this sense, the 
retributive model looks less towards the future, and instead, retrospectively examines the 
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crime that was committed and focuses on how that crime should be punished and how 
victims and society in general benefit from said punishment.   
 
The primary vehicles for the retributive justice model are domestic courts. In the 
aftermath of mass atrocities, however, domestic courts are often overwhelmed and unable 
to withstand the caseload due to lack of infrastructure and/or human resources. As such, 
numerous international mechanisms of transitional justice have emerged over the years at 
the international level, such as the ad-hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Court, and 
the specialized hybrid courts, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
A purely retributive model, however, faces several limitations.  Inherently, retributive 
theory views punishment as a debt owed by the offender to the State and society, but not 
necessarily to the victim. In fact, ‘sentencing is proportional to the definition of the act—
not the degree to which the victim was hurt. That is, the punishment is matched to the 
crime, not to the effects of the crime.’117 This is of particular significance in the context 
of sexual and gender-based violence, where the crimes committed give rise to a myriad of 
psychological and physical effects that must be addressed in order for justice to be fully 
realized. In a study carried out by Regher and Allagia about justice for victims of sexual 
violence, a judge stated the following:  
It is important that people understand the limits of the justice 
system in actually dealing with some of the fundamental 
psychological effects of victimization . . . the justice system is not 
set up to deal with emotional traumas that result from 
victimization.118 
 
 This reflects the fact that the retributive approach to transitional justice inherently 
conflicts with the ingredients necessary for reconciliation, which is the aim of any 
transitional justice process.  
 
Detractors of the retributive justice model point out that the focus on the perpetrator that 
is characteristic of individual trials does not allow for much, if any, attention to be paid to 
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the victims and to their healing process. Firstly, the question arises as to whether the 
retributive justice model is appropriate for dealing with gross human rights violations on 
a massive scale. For example, while criminal trials may be adequate for addressing 
crimes of homicide or rape, in general, does this translate to situations wherein these 
crimes are widespread and systematic and where victims number by the hundreds of 
thousands? Simply because prosecution is the routine response to ordinary criminal 
activity, is it an ‘appropriate analogy for mass human rights atrocities’ in which victims 
number by the hundreds or thousands? 119  Secondly, within the judicial process, 
particularly one involving gross violations of human rights, the chance of re-victimization 
is increased ‘as those giving testimony are cross examined in a potentially hostile and 
humiliating proceeding.’120 This is reflective of the victim’s tertiary role in classic trials. 
Regher and Allagia’s study notes that from the purely legal point of view, ‘the goal of the 
criminal justice system is to determine whether a crime has been committed whereby the 
outcome of a finding of guilt will result in the loss of liberty of the accused individual.’121 
The focus, therefore, is not on the rights of the victim(s), but ‘on the rights of the accused 
to a fair trial.’122  
 
Another noteworthy limitation to the retributive approach is the fact that the adversarial 
nature of a criminal trial does not necessarily ensure that whole truths are revealed.123 A 
central part of the justice process for victims is getting their stories heard. Particularly in 
cases of sexual and gender-based violence—crimes that are usually shrouded in silence—
it is crucial that women and girls are provided with a forum in which to tell their stories. 
As Franke notes, however, ‘this kind of truth-telling is not within the jurisdiction of 
formal legal fora. The translation of human suffering into a vocabulary and a form that is 
acceptable and appropriate to a judicial proceeding can be a dehumanising experience, 
not only for victims of sexual violence, but particularly for them [emphasis added].’124 
The potential for re-victimization and dehumanisation of victims is very real not only 
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during the trial process in which victims are witnesses, but also to the crime investigation 
process. In fact, ‘[i]f gender-based crimes are to be prosecuted, they need to be 
investigated and indicted according to international standards, and the investigators and 
prosecutors need to be trained in gender crimes and sensitive to the needs of the 
victims.’125 A significant limitation to the retributive approach is the rather inhospitable 
atmosphere victims tend to face, given their tertiary role in the judicial process. For 
example, ‘[w]hen a doctor assigned to victims testifying before the ICTY proposed that 
they be provided with psychological support during the testimony, the initial response 
was that the Tribunal was “not engaged in ‘social work,’ but important legal 
proceedings.”’ This perspective results in victims being regarded merely as sources of 
information, rather than as stakeholders in the process. Finally, the retributive approach 
can be inherently challenged by the fact that post-conflict societies often find ‘their 
adjudicatory mechanisms too weak, unskilled, biased, or corrupt to carry out the difficult 
task of overseeing fair and expeditious trials.’126 This type of atmosphere renders States 
unable to effectively investigate and prosecute gross violations of human rights and this, 
therefore, may inevitably result in miscarriage of justice. 
 
Given all of the above, it is difficult to see how justice is realized in the retributive 
context, particularly for victims. Furthermore, it is even more difficult to identify a path 
to reconciliation within such a context. In transitional societies, therefore, where society 
has been fragmented by gross violations of human rights, and where States face the 
enormous task of rebuilding judicial systems that have collapsed during conflict, it is 
imperative to recognize the need to seek an alternative to a purely retributive approach to 
that there may be more than one route to realizing justice and reconciliation.  
III.4 Restorative Justice Model 
 
As opposed to retributive justice, restorative justice focuses on victims as well as on 
perpetrators, and seeks to engage the society in a dialogue that includes elements of truth-
telling, apology, and forgiveness, and that ultimately leads to reconciliation. Restorative 
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justice is defined as ‘societal healing of damages resulting from past crimes.’127 This 
theory informs mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and it ‘step[s] 
beyond the retributive strategy—and even the justice paradigm—towards an evolving 
understanding that any dealings with the past should focus on impacting the future of the 
post conflict society constructively. This constructive, forward-looking approach aligns 
transitional justice more closely with its preventative mission.’128 The first instances of 
the restorative justice model were the Truth Commissions established in Latin America in 
the aftermath of brutal dictatorial regimes, such as Argentina’s National Commission on 
the Disappeared, created in 1983. These transitional justice mechanisms were established 
‘as a way to strengthen new democracies and comply with the moral and legal obligations 
that the human rights movement was articulating, both domestically and 
internationally.’129  
 
The goals of restorative justice include addressing the root causes of the conflict, 
involving all stakeholders in the restoration process,130 emphasizing the importance of 
truth telling, apologizing and seeking forgiveness, and preventing future conflicts through 
measures instituted to rebuild the affected societies/communities. This community-based 
model of justice focuses on bringing perpetrators and victims together and—as with 
retributive justice—ensuring restitution to the victims. Of particular relevance to victims 
of sexual and gender-based violence is the fact that truth commissions tend to take the 
focus away from the accused and focus, instead, on the victims. This communal, victim-
centric atmosphere ‘provid[es] victims and survivors with a supportive context in which 
to recount their story [and] some victims find [the experience to be] an important part of 
the healing process.’131  
 
Furthermore, despite the fact that restorative justice mechanisms are limited in terms of 
legal powers, their focus on the various multidimensional factors that contribute to 
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conflict affords them the opportunity to have more of a significant impact in terms of 
reconstructing post-conflict societies. For example, as Priscilla Haynes argues, ‘[s]ince 
[restorative justice mechanisms] are not limited to the individualized facts of a set of 
prosecutions, they can marshal and disseminate all the relevant facts about an oppressive 
regime. The record a truth commission can develop is the most powerful tool available to 
inoculate a society against dictatorial methods.’ 132  As established above, retributive 
mechanisms provide for truth-telling only in a limited sense—victims’ testimonies are 
legally relevant only in the sense that they provide information necessary only to 
prosecuting or defending the accused. The truth-telling function of truth and 
reconciliation commissions, however, is ‘able to develop a more comprehensive record 
and understanding of the full scale of violations.’133 This notion of more comprehensive 
truth-telling within a communal setting is what most definitively sets restorative justice 
mechanisms such as these apart from retributive justice mechanisms. 
  
Despite the common underlying values of justice and reconciliation, therefore, the key 
difference between the retributive and the restorative justice models is the fact that while 
the former focuses on punitive measures aimed at the individual perpetrator, the latter 
focuses on collective efforts to deal with the consequences of the crimes committed and 
to ensure reparation of the subsequent damage. While non-judicial mechanisms such as 
truth commissions are unable to prosecute crimes of international human rights law, their 
proponents argue that they serve a crucial complementary role in the transitional justice 
process. In her discussions on truth commissions established over the last 20 years, 
Priscilla Hayner States that ‘[i]f you look at the experience of countries in the past, and 
the impact that information from truth commissions has had in feeding into prosecutions 
that followed, I think we can argue very strongly that truth commissions are 
complementary and even strengthen prosecutions.’134  This complementary nature can 
also be attributed to alternative restorative justice mechanisms such as traditional 
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tribunals, which ‘often involve religious leaders, village elders and local officials in 
resolving domestic or communal conflicts, including rape and domestic violence.’135 
Such mechanisms are often employed when the legal system becomes overburdened and 
unable to withstand the existing caseload. An example of such national mechanisms of 
transitional justice is the gacaca court system established in Rwanda in 2001 to address 
genocide crimes.  
 
This system was established as an alternative to the national courts, which were 
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of cases with which it was faced. The gacaca tribunals 
provide a forum within which the accused is given the opportunity either to confess or to 
answer to the charges against him/her and to provide his/her own account. Members of 
the panel of judges are given the opportunity to question both the accused and the general 
assembly; and the members of community are given the opportunity to provide testimony 
and to seek answers from the accused.136 An advantage of these courts is not only their 
ability to offer an alternative route to justice, but also to ‘offer familiarity and legitimacy 
to the population [thereby contributing] to reconciliation and reconstruction.’137 As is the 
case with truth commissions, the role of local or traditional courts is complementary and 
is meant to work in cooperation with other mechanisms within the transitional justice 
sphere. Restorative justice, therefore, differs from retributive justice in the sense that it 
provides for the building of a foundation for future reconciliation and for restoration of 
societies fragmented by conflict. Standing alone, however, such restorative mechanisms 
face significant limitations in terms of attaining the goals of transitional justice.  
 
In the context of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence in particular, limitations of 
restorative mechanisms include; the use of a non-judicial forum to address violations of 
international human rights law; the exclusion of such crimes in the mandates and 
procedural measures of restorative mechanisms; and the lack of privacy and protection 
due to the public nature of these communal mechanisms. The non-judicial nature of the 
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restorative approach means that crimes of sexual and gender-based violence cannot be 
dealt with in accordance with international law. One key shortcoming to utilizing the 
restorative justice approach is the obvious: how can a State ensure the eradication of a 
culture of impunity without imposing sanctions for the crimes that have been committed? 
The very nature of truth commissions, for example, entails that ‘[they] cannot match 
prosecutions with respect to the fulfilment of the important policy goals regarding 
punishment.’138 While the community-based approach does have its merits in the sense 
that it provides a forum for dialogue between perpetrators and victims, is justice truly 
achieved if those who wilfully carried out programs of torture, murder, mutilation, and 
slavery are granted amnesty? Aneta Wierzynska argues that restorative justice 
mechanisms ‘tie stakeholders…into a system of mutual accountability.’ 139  Does this 
mutual accountability not then take away from the importance of establishing individual 
criminal accountability so central to the maintenance of and adherence to international 
human rights law? This issue is of particular significance when it comes to addressing 
gross violation of human rights that have been committed on a massive scale. Since one 
of the goals of transitional justice is to ensure the prevention of future violations, it is 
difficult to see how that can be achieved if emphasis is placed solely on discovery and 
dissemination of truth, rather than on punitive measures.  
 
Another challenge to the restorative justice model in the context of sexual and gender-
based violence is the exclusion of such crimes in the process, and the subordinate status 
accorded to such crimes in comparison to other gross violations of human rights. In order 
for restorative justice mechanisms to effectively deal with crimes of sexual and gender-
based violence, these crimes must be included in the specific mandate establishing the 
mechanism. In addition, they must be treated with equal gravity as other crimes against 
humanity. As established in Chapter II, before the landmark developments made by the 
ad-hoc tribunals, sexual and gender-based violence remained firmly on the fringes of the 
international legal sphere. This was somewhat reflected in the mandates and reports of 
various Truth Commissions, such as the Salvadoran Commission on Truth (1993), whose 
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report excluded testimony of rape and sexual violence because they fell outside a 
mandate that was limited to ‘politically motivated acts.’ 140  In some cases, Truth 
Commission Reports included sexual violence, but only insomuch as it constituted 
torture. 141  In 1995, the South African Truth & Reconciliation Commission was 
established without the inclusion of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. In fact, 
it was not until a study was conducted in 1996 highlighting the suppression of women’s 
perspectives in truth commissions over the previous 33 years142 that South Africa took 
steps to ensure: 
 the inclusion of gender-based and sexual violence in the definition of gross human 
rights violations; 
 changes to the Statement protocol to inform women of the importance of relating 
incidences during which they themselves were the victims; and 
 the addition of special women-only hearings.143 
 
It is evident, therefore, that in the hands of restorative justice mechanisms, therefore, 
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence are susceptible to falling through the cracks 
of the transitional justice system unless they are specifically prioritized. 
 
A final challenge facing the restorative model is the lack of participation of women in the 
process, whether as witnesses or as officials. Testimony regarding crimes directed 
specifically against women, including rape and sexual violence, is provided in truth 
commissions significantly less than testimony about other violations of human rights.144 
When women do come forward to provide testimony, experts note that they ‘downplay 
their own experiences and focus on crimes committed against their husbands, sons and 
families’ and even ‘crimes committed against other women.’145 The general reluctance of 
women to divulge information concerning their own violations ‘is due in part to the 
stigma associated with reporting these crimes, in part to the lack of protection and 
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support for women survivors and in part to women's unfamiliarity with the processes.’146 
Many women and girls continue to carry not only the physical scars of rape and sexual 
violence, but also the psychological burden of being unable to disclose information on 
their assaults, lest they are ostracized.147 Furthermore, all too often, the atmosphere of 
these mechanisms is not conducive to encouraging or facilitating the testimony of 
victims.148  Restorative justice mechanisms cannot effectively address crimes of sexual 
and gender-based violence without ensuring the participation of women judges or 
commissioners; the institution of specialized mechanisms, such as providing the option of 
the provision of testimony in closed sessions (in camera); and the dissemination of 
information concerning the structure and procedure of these mechanisms. Without the 
above, these mechanisms run the risk of lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the transitional 
society for which they are established. And without this legitimacy, the sense of 
communal ownership so necessary for the success of restorative justice mechanisms is 
gravely compromised.  
 
III.5 Comprehensive Model of Transitional Justice 
 
The theoretical debate concerning whether or not retributive or restorative justice 
approaches are more successful is ongoing, and there are evidently numerous limitations 
to the use of either a strictly retributive or restorative approach. There exist numerous 
mechanisms of transitional justice at both the international and national level that fall into 
either the retributive or restoration models. What is evident from the different 
mechanisms utilized by both models of justice is that a) in the face of gross violations of 
human rights on such an enormous scale, no one mechanism will suffice; and b) the 
choice of which path to take to achieve justice and reconciliation is not based on 
theoretical debate, but on which path or paths best suit the needs of a particular society. 
The answer to all the open-ended questions raised by strict adherence to either model is 
that ‘[i]n most cases, justice demands the deployment of a number of these tools, given 
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that no one of them can adequately address and repair the injuries of the past nor chart a 
fully just future. Transitional justice will always be incomplete and messy.’149  
 
In which case, an effective transitional justice requires a multi-dimensional approach in 
order to achieve reconciliation and to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Post-conflict 
societies, therefore, must be willing to embrace an approach that combines both judicial 
and non-judicial processes aimed at addressing the past and preventing future conflict. 
Fletcher and Weinstein suggest an ‘ecological approach’ to social reconstruction that 
includes, in addition to justice, elements of democracy, economic prosperity and 
transformation, and reconciliation.150 In the context of sexual and gender-based violence, 
this approach must take into account the specific physical, psychological, and socio-
economic effects of such crimes, not only on society as a whole, but on the victims in 
particular. The ideal holistic and comprehensive approach, which will be explored further 
in a later chapter, would therefore include: 
 
 Establishing individual criminal responsibility through prosecutions at the 
national and/or international level through national courts, ad-hoc tribunals, the 
International Criminal Court, or ‘hybrid’ internationalised courts. 
 Establishing community-based mechanisms centred on truth-telling through 
confessions of perpetrators and testimony of victims and witnesses. These may or 
may not include the element of forgiveness. 
 Undertaking the reform of archaic institutions and legislation that may have 
contributed to a culture of impunity and lack of respect for human rights and rule 
of law. 
 Encouraging reconciliation through preservation of memory and initiation, and 
promotion of national dialogue, thereby discouraging a conspiracy of silence and 
eliminating the stigma surrounding sexual and gender-based violence. 
 Establishing reparations for victims, including financial compensation and 





From the above discussion thus far, it becomes clear that even with the consolidation of 
international legal protection for conflict-related crimes of sexual and gender-based 
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violence, each post-conflict society requires a model of transitional justice that ensures 
that these international developments are reflected in the domestic sphere. The present 
chapter has set out the theoretical discussion for and against the restorative and 
retributive models of transitional justice and has established that either approach faces 
considerable limitations when it comes to practical implementation. Whether utilizing 
international and/or national mechanisms, a society cannot rely on a single model to 
ensure justice and reconciliation. The next chapter will examine Rwanda’s various 
mechanisms of transitional justice in order to illustrate examples of the limitations 
outlined in Chapter III, particularly in the context of crimes of sexual and gender-based 
violence. The aim of the chapter is to establish that in a society so fragmented by 
genocide and its aftermath that it has essentially had to be rebuilt, the pursuit of justice 











The last few chapters have established that within the last decade, developments made in 
the arena of gender justice, though not yet adequate, have been significant indeed and 
have demonstrated a marked progress from antiquated notions of rape and sexual 
violence as crimes against honour to the institutionalisation of such acts as violations of 
international human rights law. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this statutory 
and jurisprudential evolution at the international level translates into actual 
implementation of safeguards—legal or otherwise—that will ensure protection for past, 
present, and future victims of this violence. The true test of whether or not these 
developments are not merely symbolic, however, is whether or not they carry any actual 
weight in transitional societies. The previous chapter has established that each model of 
transitional justice—whether retributive or restorative—is hindered by various limitations 
and, as such, transitional societies must employ a comprehensive model of transitional 
justice, specific to their particular circumstances, that addresses the multifaceted effects 
of sexual and gender-based violence. This chapter aims to provide further insight into the 
challenges facing the transitional justice process by analysing the experience of post-
genocide Rwanda in addressing crimes of sexual and gender-based violence.  
 
In the aftermath of the genocide, the transitional mechanisms employed by Rwanda at 
both the national and international level have been tasked with dealing with 
overwhelming obstacles primarily due to the sheer volume of perpetrators and victims, 
and due to the effects on a society and State literally and figuratively torn apart by gross 
violations of human rights. This chapter will analyse Rwanda’s retributive mechanisms of 
transitional justice (the ICTR and the national formal courts) and its largely restorative 
mechanism of transitional justice (the traditional gacaca courts) to demonstrate that the 
implementation process has been plagued by numerous substantial and procedural 





justice and reconciliation for victims of sexual and gender-based violence specifically, 
and for Rwandan society in general.  
IV.2 Rwanda’s Retributive Justice Mechanisms 
IV.2.1 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
As established in the previous chapter, transitional societies can employ retributive 
justice mechanisms at both the international and national levels. In Rwanda, the 
transitional government was confronted with innumerable obstacles in the process of 
attempting to rebuild a society shattered by the effects of genocide, and marked with a 
history of impunity and human rights abuses. In the spirit of retributive justice, the most 
significant and urgent legal issue in the aftermath of the genocide was the prosecution of 
the masterminds and ringleaders of the genocide, a task that fell largely under the 
jurisdiction of the ICTR.  The ICTR’s statutory and jurisprudential developments as 
regards sexual and gender-based violence are outlined in Chapter II and, in view of the 
precedents set in the Akayesu case, there is no longer a reason to exclude charges of rape 
and sexual violence from virtually every indictment brought before the Tribunal. 151  
Numerous scholars of gender justice, however, maintain that in light of the substantial 
and procedural anomalies that have characterized subsequent decisions and in light of the 
Tribunal’s general approach to crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, Akayesu may 
well be the exception rather than the rule. Despite the momentous findings in Akayesu, 
the ICTR has been slow and ineffective in terms of investigating and prosecuting crimes 
of sexual violence. As Copelon argues, ‘[t]here is an apparent absence of both a clear 
policy that gender is a priority concern and of a gender expert, with oversight authority, 
on-site. Issues of witness protection, the gender-sensitivity of investigations, and 
community relations have been equally significant.’ 152  Some reasons given by 
international investigators and prosecutors as reasons not to pursue charges of rape and 
sexual violence at the ICTR are as follows: ‘African women will not talk about rape;’ 
‘We don't have the evidence;’ ‘Women's rights activists are trying to make the issue of 
rape more important than it should be;’ and ‘The rapes were a case of libido, not 
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genocide crimes.’153 Unfortunately, the nature and origin of these statements serve to 
confirm the subordinate status generally afforded to crimes of sexual violence. 
 
The viewpoints expressed in the above statements are also reflected in the actions and 
inactions of the tribunal. Indeed the ICTR has been plagued by shortcomings ranging 
from failure to incorporate charges of sexual violence in various cases to the 
maltreatment of victims/witnesses.154 As a result, the gains made by the ad-hoc tribunals 
have been overshadowed by the severe limitations that have crippled the ICTR’s ability 
to effectively prosecute crimes of sexual violence. Generally speaking, survivors of the 
genocide are mistrustful and sceptical of the Tribunal, a fact compounded by the fact that 
the Tribunal is situated in Tanzania rather than in Rwanda.155  The distance between 
survivors and the Tribunal is literal as well as figurative, as demonstrated by a 2003 study 
that examines in detail how victims of rape and sexual violence understand and perceive 
the ICTR.156 The study categorizes survivors’ concerns into aspects of jurisprudence and 
aspects of justice. In terms of jurisprudence, Rwandan women are primarily concerned 
with public acknowledgement of the atrocities they endured and ‘want the record to show 
that they were subjected to horrific sexual violence at the hands of those who instigated 
and carried out the genocide.’157 In other words, the jurisprudence of the tribunal must 
reflect the true nature and extent of the crimes committed. In terms of justice, women in 
Rwanda have significant concerns regarding the procedural aspects of the Tribunal’s 
handling of rape and sexual violence, essentially requiring a legal process ‘that treats rape 
survivors with the utmost respect and care at all stages of the process [emphasis 
added].’158 Justice for victims therefore includes, but is not limited to, the manner in 
which the Tribunal treats them. This section will begin by examining the investigation 
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and prosecution processes of the ICTR in order to illustrate the ongoing challenges to 
jurisprudential development. 
 
Regarding jurisprudence, the prosecution of crimes of rape and sexual violence is of vital 
importance because it provides an opportunity for victims’ experiences to be recognized 
and to be reflected in the law. This issue is particularly urgent for survivors who are 
living with HIV/AIDS. According to one such survivor, without this aspect, ‘[f]or those 
of us on the road to death, this justice will be too slow…no one will know our story…. 
What happened to us will be buried with us.’ 159  A simple case of justice delayed, 
therefore, is justice denied. The significance of retributive justice mechanisms such as 
international tribunals, therefore, is that they can provide public condemnation, which is a 
crucial aspect of the rebuilding process. Maintaining a public record is inherent in the 
ICTR’s commitment to contribute to national reconciliation as stipulated in its mandate. 
It is therefore vital that the ICTR utilize its position to spotlight crimes of rape and sexual 
violence. Otherwise, as Nowrojee warns, with the jurisprudence as it currently stands, the 
ICTR is in danger of losing the legacy it was on the verge of creating with the Akayesu 
case.160 
IV.2.1.1 ICTR: Investigation and Prosecution 
 
From the outset, charges of rape and sexual violence were not included in the Tribunal’s 
initial indictments, including that of Akayesu, despite the fact that the crime of rape is 
provided for in the ICTR Statute as both a crime against humanity, as well as a war 
crime.161  At the time of Akayesu’s indictment, Human Rights Watch had released a 
report that focused, among other things, on rape and sexual violence in the Taba 
Commune, of which Akayesu was the burgomestre.162 The report noted the ‘failure of the 
prosecutorial staff to take rape seriously, as well as the utter inappropriateness and lack of 
training of the investigative staff to undertake such an inquiry.’163 Furthermore, Human 
Rights Watch reported that ‘[t]here is a widespread perception among the Tribunal 
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investigators that rape is somehow a ‘lesser’ or ‘incidental’ crime not worth 
investigating.’164 In spite of the glaring evidence that rape had taken place on a massive 
scale in Taba as well as all over the country, the Akayesu case initially went to trial with 
no charges of rape, with the prosecutor maintaining that it was impossible to document 
rape because women would not talk about it.165 It is evident that, at this juncture, rape 
was still considered a mere by-product of conflict, and was not being treated with the 
necessary gravity. 
 
During the Akayesu trial two female witnesses were brought forth to provide evidence 
concerning crimes that took place in the Taba Commune. Although the prosecution 
notably did not question the witnesses about rape or sexual violence, the only female 
judge on the Trial Chamber, Honourable Navanethem Pillay, intervened and pursued a 
line of questioning that resulted in confirmation from the two witnesses that they had 
been raped and had witnessed and/or known of other rapes that took place within the 
commune. The outraged judge then stated that she was ‘extremely dismayed that [the 
Tribunal was] hearing evidence of rape and sexual violence against women and children, 
yet it is not in the indictments because the witnesses were never asked about it [emphasis 
added].’166The fact that prosecutors did not even consider questioning female witnesses 
about rape is illustrative of how little importance was attached to crimes of sexual 
violence committed during the genocide. Subsequently, numerous extra-judicial efforts 
were exerted in order to ensure the indictment was amended to include charges of rape or 
sexual violence.167 That the only female judge in the court was the one to draw attention 
to the issue of rape is no coincidence: ‘[t]he lessons from the Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
Tribunals make it clear that the presence of female judges, as well as the presence of 
women in senior positions in the prosecutor’s office, contributes significantly to the 
effective prosecution of sexual violence against women’.168 Judge Pillay summed up the 
importance of the composition of the court as follows: ‘Who interprets the law is at least 
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as important as who makes the law, if not more so . . . I cannot stress how critical I 
consider it to be that women are represented and a gender perspective integrated at all 
levels of the investigation, prosecution, defence, witness protection and judiciary.’169 It is 
evident, therefore, that in order to ensure the consistent application of the law concerning 
international crimes of sexual violence, criminal tribunals and courts must have equal 
representation of women on the bench and in the office of the prosecutor. Equally as 
important, however, is the need to ensure that all judges and officers of the court are 
experienced or trained in gender issues. 
 
The presence of women on the bench and as officers of the court, while important, does 
not necessarily guarantee prosecution of gender crimes. Engendering the Tribunal’s 
bench and prosecutor’s office, however, is of virtually no use if the prosecutorial strategy 
does not include the prioritisations of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. 
Nowrojee’s study illustrates the vital importance of political will in prosecutions of 
crimes of sexual violence and attributes the failure to adequately investigate and 
prosecute such crimes on a lack of sustained attention by the leadership in the 
prosecutor’s office: ‘Despite the rhetoric and the repeated pronouncements expressing a 
commitment to prosecuting rape, the Prosecutor’s Office has never articulated and 
pursued a consistent prosecution strategy, including how this crime fitted into the 
genocidal policies of the leaders, nor has it consistently employed effective investigative 
techniques to fully document the crimes against women.’170 Through her review, it is 
evident that inclusion of charges of sexual violence crimes in indictments depends a great 
deal on the policy and strategy of an individual: the head prosecutor.171  To wit, during 
the tenure of Louise Arbour from October 1996-August 1999, political will to prosecute 
crimes against women and young girls was evident and ‘sexual violence amendments 
were added to a number of cases, and rape charges were increasingly included in the new 
indictments. By the last year of her mandate, all new indictments contained sexual 
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violence charges.’ 172  Unfortunately, however, during Carla del Ponte’s tenure from 
September 1999 to October 2003, ‘there was a steady decline in the number of new 
indictments that contained sexual violence charges, as well as a lack of commitment to 
adequately develop the evidence in cases where rape charges had previously been 
included. The sexual assault investigations team was disbanded, and investigations of 
sexual violence faltered…. By [her] final year, none of the new indictments contained 
rape charges.’173 According to quantitative data regarding the trends in prosecution of 
sexual violence, the proportion of indictments pertaining to sexual violence fell from 
100% in 1999-2000 to 35% in 2001-2002: 
 
Image Source: Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations174 
 
This drastic change is attributed to a change of strategy wherein Del Ponte’s focus was on 
expediting the notoriously slow pace of ICTR trials, rather than on ensuring the 
prosecution of rape and sexual violence.175  
 
Evidently, lack of political will results in a lack of comprehensive strategy, which is 
reflected in a weak infrastructure, which in turn results in inadequate investigations 
characterized by lack of communication, lack of skills in obtaining evidence of rape and 
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sexual violence from victims, and lack of training on gender issues. For example, in 
2003, out of the 100 investigators in the prosecutor’s office, only five were women; 
moreover, the sexual assaults team has never comprised of more than 10 individuals—an 
almost insignificant fraction of the tribunal’s workforce. 176  The outright lack of 
commitment to prosecuting crimes of sexual and gender-based violence sends a direct 
message to victims that these crimes trivial in comparison to other gross violations of 
human rights and are, therefore, not a priority. Furthermore, it renders ineffectual any 
statutory developments that have been made thus far ineffectual and raises the question as 
to what purpose this transitional justice mechanism truly serves for victims of sexual 
violence.  
 
The consequences of lack of political will are evident in several prominent cases that 
eventually went to trial without the inclusion of charges of sexual violence, despite a 
plethora of available evidence of rape and sexual violence.  In the Cyangugu case, for 
example, three former government officials were on trial for genocidal massacres and 
other crimes against humanity. 177   Rwandan women in Cyangugu had organized 
themselves in order to assist the ICTR staff in collecting testimonies providing evidence 
of rape and sexual violence and had further pledged their willingness to testify; a 
widows’ organization, AVEGA, issued a public statement pleading that the ICTR not 
ignore the rape that had occurred in Cyangugu; 178 and two witnesses provided testimony 
of the sexual violence that had occurred. An amendment to the initial indictment was 
filed late by the prosecutor’s office, and then withdrawn in 1999. As a result, when a 
third witness was being questioned about rape and sexual violence in February 2001, the 
judges barred the testimony on the grounds that it had not specifically been included in 
the initial indictment.
179 The case resulted in two acquittals and one conviction, with the 
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prosecution maintaining that an amendment to the indictment of acts of sexual violence 
would have delayed the trial.180  
 
This is but one example that demonstrates why victims of sexual and gender-based 
violence are distrustful of the ICTR and are highly dubious about its ability to deliver 
justice.  Furthermore, it demonstrates the precariousness of prosecutorial strategy being 
determined by an individual’s priorities, rather than being explicitly included in an 
official mandate. This inevitably leads to inconsistency, injustice on the part of the 
victims, and ultimately results in a loss of credibility for a Tribunal that has the potential 
to make significant gains in terms of sexual and gender-based violence. If such crimes are 
to be prosecuted successfully, they must be investigated and indicted according to 
international standards, and investigators and prosecutors must be trained in gender 
crimes and be sensitised as to the needs of the victims and witnesses. Without the 
participation of women survivors, the prosecution would not be able to successfully 
prosecute crimes of sexual violence. 
IV.2.1.2 Procedural Obstacles at the ICTR 
 
The literal and figurative distance between the ICTR and the people of Rwanda appears 
to present the most significant obstacle to the tribunal’s contribution to executing justice 
and to ensuring peace and reconciliation in the country. In a study conducted by Alison 
Des Forges and Timothy Longman in 2002 regarding the impact of the tribunal on the 
people of Rwanda, ‘respondents complained that the trials were held far away from 
Rwanda and were organized using western-style judicial practices that place a heavy 
emphasis on procedure and have little concern for community interests.’181 One of the 
goals of retributive justice, as outlined in Chapter III, is to establish adherence to rule of 
law and to restore society’s faith in the country’s administrative and judicial systems. If 
the society is unable to relate to a mechanism of transitional justice, however, and 
continues to perceive it as a foreign apparatus, it is highly unlikely that it can contribute 
in any way to the reconciliation process.  Since it is virtually impossible for genocide 
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survivors to witness the trials firsthand, bridging the gap requires the maintenance of 
communication between the ICTR and the people, something that has been sorely lacking 
throughout the Tribunal’s proceedings. Although the ICTR has made certain efforts to 
respond to the need for information—such as establishing an information centre in the 
capital city of Kigali—there are no outreach programs conducted in the local language 
(Kinyarwanda) that are able to reach the rest of the country.182  
 
Respondents in the Des Forges and Longman study further complained about 
mistreatment of witnesses and about the foreign nature of the adversarial legal approach 
used in trials, in which ‘survivors of the genocide [play] no formal role other than as 
witnesses.’183 This approach is far removed from the traditional Rwandan communal 
system of conflict-resolution, and therefore further alienates the people from the process. 
For victims of sexual violence, in particular, the alienation is further compounded by lack 
of information and follow-up from the Tribunal during and after the arduous process of 
providing testimony. The nature of the process is such that witnesses are sequestered 
prior to and following their court appearance and—although provided with protection—
are provided with little or no information on the trial process. Furthermore, upon their 
return to Rwanda, they receive little or no follow-up information on the progress or 
outcome of the trial.184 As a result, rape victims who testify are left feeling used and, in 
some cases, re-victimized by the process. The involvement of victims in trials, other than 
as witnesses, tends to deny survivors the ‘cathartic experience of a process that focuses 
on them as victims.’185 The tribunal’s failure to integrate victims into the process through 
the dissemination of information fosters a lack of faith on the part of survivors who can 
only interpret the process as justice denied. 
 
One of the most notable shortcomings of the ICTR is that, in addition to witnesses feeling 
alienated and mistreated, they also feel demeaned and disrespected by the tribunal and are 
therefore reluctant to cooperate and give testimony. Many witnesses have complained of 
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degrading treatment at the hands of the tribunal, the most infamous incident occurring 
during the cross-examination of a witness who had been subjected to rape and sexual 
torture. During the witness’ testimony, all three judges on the panel were laughing, 
apparently at an inappropriate and absurd line of questioning from the defence council, 
and the unexplained laughter was perceived as intimidation and mockery of the 
witness.186 In a separate incident, during a fact-finding mission, defence lawyers were 
found to have degraded and discredited women by demanding that they name, 
unnecessarily and in extreme detail, sexual organs and how they were used during 
violations187—a demand that exposes blatant cultural insensitivity and is essentially a tool 
of re-victimization. Finally, women complain of not having received the necessary 
witness protection as required by the Rules of the Tribunal.188 The lack of anonymity and 
confidentiality regarding court transcripts has left many women vulnerable and 
susceptible to retaliation attacks upon returning to their communities. In fact, numerous 
women who have testified at the ICTR have lost their lives as a result of the lack of 
safeguards in place to ensure their identities are protected.189 As a result of occurrences 
such as these over the years, numerous survivors’ organizations have chosen to forego all 
cooperation with the ICTR.190  
 
Judging from these experiences, it appears as though the strict retributive nature of the 
tribunal necessitates that the justice served has little to do with the victims of conflict. 
Yet, in what Franke describes as ‘a perverse fact’ of the retributive approach to 
transitional justice, witnesses are essentially ‘invaluable resources in the production of 
wholesale justice, but [unfortunately] the individuals become less important than the 
larger principles which their testimony helps establish.’191 Consequently, this treatment of 
victims and witnesses reinforces the erroneous notion already prevalent in the minds of 
survivors of sexual violence that such crimes are either private (and therefore not 
punishable) or merely a by-product of conflict. The maltreatment of witnesses highlights 
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the fact that retributive mechanisms of transitional justice such as tribunals need to 
incorporate further safeguards in order to ensure the protection of victims and witnesses. 
Considering how far international law has advanced in terms of defining crimes of sexual 
and gender-based violence, this oversight on the part of the ICTR represents a 
considerable setback in the transitional justice process.  
IV.2.2 National Retributive Justice Mechanism: the ‘Classic’ Courts 
 
In addition to the establishment of the ICTR, the Rwanda transitional government itself 
embarked on a process of legal reform in order to address the heinous violations of 
human rights that were so flagrantly committed during the genocide. The national judicial 
system became the primary avenue for prosecuting those lower-level actors who were not 
among the organizers, but who actively participated in the genocide. In the immediate 
aftermath of the genocide this judicial system was more or less nonexistent. In terms of 
human resources, almost all members of the judiciary had either been massacred or had 
fled into exile, to the extent that ‘by the end of the genocide, Rwanda counted only 
twenty judicial personnel responsible for criminal investigations and only nineteen 
lawyers.’192 In addition, the physical destruction that took place during the genocide left 
the infrastructure significantly weakened. Moreover, existing laws at the time of the 
genocide were grossly insufficient to contend with the nature, scale, and intensity of the 
crimes committed—particularly crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, which were 
so widespread and ubiquitous throughout the conflict. 
IV.2.2.1 Statutory Developments 
 
Prior to the genocide, the only provisions in place to prosecute crimes of sexual violence 
were contained within the 1977 Rwandan Penal Code. The Penal Code prohibits 
defilement, rape, torture and sexual torture but legal definitions of these acts are not 
provided.193 With respect to sexual torture, though not explicitly referred to as such, 
Article 316 provides that a person who commits ‘torture or acts of barbarity’ during the 
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commission of a crime incurs the same punishment as one who commits murder.194  
When the transitional government took power, 120,000 people were detained for various 
crimes of genocide, including rape and sexual torture and mutilation. Inevitably, the 
judiciary was severely overwhelmed and increasingly incapable of bearing the burden 
imposed by the large number of individuals awaiting prosecution for genocide, and it was 
evident that the existing penal code would not suffice. To this end, the State enacted the 
Organic Law No.08/96 of 30th August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for 
Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed 
Since 1 October 1990 (hereafter, Genocide Law). The Genocide Law was passed, 
therefore, in recognition of the fact that ‘the exceptional situation in the country requires 
the adoption of specially adapted measures to satisfy the need for justice of the people of 
Rwanda.’195 The key aspect of the 1996 Genocide Law is the categorization of genocide 
defendants into four Categories, as delineated in its Chapter 2, Articles 2-3. Perpetrators 
of sexual and gender-based violence fall into Category One, which defines the most 
serious offenders as: 
 
 persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them 
among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime 
of genocide or of a crime against humanity; 
 persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral, communal, 
sector or cell level, or in a political party, the army, religious organizations or in a 
militia and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes; 
 notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which: 
they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or 
where they passed; 
 and persons who committed acts of sexual torture; 
 
 
In this instance, sexual torture refers to ‘grave sexual torture, which can include repeated 
rape or mutilation.’196 This interpretation harmonizes with Article 316 of the Rwandan 
Penal Code, which likens the use of torture for the purposes for executing a crime to 
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murder.197 Reinforcing the notion of sexual violence as a most serious violation is the fact 
that, as per Chapter III of the Genocide Law, there exists a possibility for the reduction of 
punitive measures upon confession or the entry of a guilty plea for all Categories except 
Category One.  This provision is critical and momentous because it mirrors the 
developments made at the international level by placing crimes of sexual torture on equal 
footing, in terms of gravity, as the rest of the genocide crimes considered most serious.  
Furthermore, as part of its transitional process, Rwanda adopted a new Constitution in 
2003 that provides for the country’s adherence to various instruments of international 
human rights law198 and emphasizes the country’s commitment ‘to ensuring equal rights 
between Rwandese and between women and men without prejudice to the principles of 
gender equality and complementarity in national development.’ 199  This further 
commitment to incorporate principles of international human rights law and to ensure 
gender equality further sets the legal context for addressing crimes of sexual and gender-
based violence in Rwanda.   
IV.2.2.2 Investigation and Prosecution 
 
 
As in the case of the ICTR, despite the statutory developments establishing sexual and 
gender-based violence as some of the most serious crimes committed during the 
genocide, the transitional justice process through Rwanda’s national courts is plagued by 
substantial and procedural obstacles both in terms of investigation, and of prosecution of 
such crimes in Rwanda’s national ‘classic’ courts. Classic courts are referred to as such to 
differentiate the formal legal system from the informal gacaca courts. As mentioned 
earlier, in the aftermath of the genocide the primary avenue for addressing crimes of 
sexual violence is through prosecution in the national courts.  From December 1996 to 
December 2003, in both the civil courts (Tribunals of First Instance) and military courts, 
9,728 persons accused of genocide, and of crimes against humanity or of related crimes 
were brought to trial. Out of the 1000 cases reviewed by Human Rights Watch, only 
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thirty-two included charges of rape or sexual torture.200  Furthermore, ‘the review of 
genocide judgments reveals the paucity of genocide sexual violence prosecutions and an 
onerous caseload that has delayed genocide trials and subjected those accused of 
genocide—including rape—to extended pre-trial detention.’ 201  The success level of 
prosecution varied based on geography and other circumstances. However, ‘genocide 
trials involving rape fall far short of the estimated tens of thousands of acts of sexual 
violence during the genocide.’202Prosecutors attribute the low rate of prosecutions of 
crimes of sexual violence primarily to the failure of victims to report the crimes 
committed against them. There are numerous factors contributing to why women and 
girls are reluctant to come forward and why those who do continue to meet with obstacles 
to justice.  
 
A significant contributing factor to underreporting of sexual violence cases is the fact that 
there are some instances in which women are unable to report sexual violence, even if 
they are willing: there are cases in which women simply do not know or remember the 
identities of their attackers,203 particularly in instances of gang rape, or sexual assault that 
took place outside the region in which they lived. In addition there is the ever-present fear 
of stigmatisation which, combined with shame and self-blame, leads many victims to 
internalise their grief and trauma in order to protect themselves: one victim refused to tell 
even her husband about her rape because  ‘for a very long time, [she has] despised the sin 
of adultery.’204 The reluctance to report crimes of sexual violence stems not only from 
fear and shame, however, but also from a general distrust of the legal system. On January 
1 2003, a Presidential decree provisionally released over 40,000 detainees who had been 
awaiting trial for genocide. Detainees included youth, the elderly, the infirm, those who 
had served over half the sentences applicable to the crime in question and—
subsequently—those who had confessed and pleaded guilty to lesser acts of genocide as 
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outlined in the 2001 Organic Law on Genocide.205  Members of the latter group are 
released conditionally, and must face the traditional gacaca courts. Although sexual 
violence survivors have reacted in a variety of ways to the actual and/or prospective 
release of detainees, the potential and actual re-traumatisation of coming face to face with 
their attackers without having seen justice served has shaken survivors’ faith in the 
justice system,206 it raises questions as to whether or not the State can truly afford them 
legal protection. Finally, women tend not to come forward because they remain generally 
unaware of their legal rights and of the protections available to them, such as the right to 
provide testimony in writing or in camera in order to ensure privacy.207 Underreporting of 
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, therefore, is largely due to victims’ 
insecurity based not only on feelings of shame and fear, but also on ignorance about and 
mistrust of the legal system. For those women who manage to circumvent these hurdles 
and find the impetus to come forth, further obstacles exist in the form of substantial and 
procedural limitations within the formal legal system that threaten to hinder the process 
of justice.  
 
As with the ICTR, in terms of jurisprudential and procedural obstacles, several key issues 
stand between the victims of sexual and gender-based violence and the justice they seek. 
The first is the lack of a clear definition of rape and sexual torture in the Penal Code, 
which ultimately leads to inconsistency in verdicts: ‘[a]n examination of judgments in 
genocide trials reveals that the failure to define rape in the Penal Code had contributed to 
considerable confusion among witnesses, accused, prosecutors, and judges. The reliance 
on judicial discretion to characterize an act of sexual violence has produced inconsistent 
guilty verdicts and punishments.’208 The lack of clarity leads to confusion, therefore, at 
several stages, including the pre-trial stages in which prosecutors are determining what 
charges to include in an indictment. The absence of a clear and concise definition or rape 
and other forms of sexual violence is imperative at this stage because, as demonstrated 
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earlier in the context of the ICTR, whether or not such crimes are included in an 
indictment depends on how the individual prosecutor interprets their respective 
definitions.  
 
The second obstacle hindering the investigation process is the fact that some rape charges 
are never filed or followed through, even when a case has been reported to authorities: 
‘the women who complained of authorities’ failure to record the charges of…sexual 
violence reported that their alleged rapists were imprisoned for crimes other than sexual 
violence and had since been granted provisional release’ as per the Presidential Order.209 
As such, women who have risked stigma, ostracisation, and threats on their life have had 
to contend with the return of their attackers to their community upon provisional release, 
without having been punished for the torture they inflicted. In fact, according to NGO 
representatives and victims, ‘in the initial period after the genocide investigators often did 
not consider rape to be as serious an offense [sic] as other accusations, such as murder, 
against the same suspect.’210 Consequently, the authorities send the message that crimes 
of sexual violence do not warrant the same attention and punishment as other crimes of 
genocide and women become increasingly reluctant to expose themselves by reporting 
crimes that are likely to be ignored. As has been illustrated by the situation in the ICTR, 
reliance on an individual’s interpretation of the law or prioritisation of crimes leads to 
inconsistency, and ultimately to a miscarriage of justice. A clear strategy and mandate is 
therefore necessary, at all stages of investigation and prosecution, in order to ensure 
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence are a priority and are accorded the same 
treatment as other Category One crimes. 
 
The lack of women in positions of authority within the Rwandan legal system presents 
yet another obstacle to justice. As was demonstrated in the ICTR’s Akayesu case, the 
importance of female judges and court personnel is essential in ensuring access to justice 
for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. In Rwanda, women continue to be 
underrepresented within the national police force, the Prosecutor General’s office, and 
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within the courts.211 Human Rights Watch maintains that ‘[p]ersons who have suffered 
sexual violence continue to experience trauma for a long period after the assault, and 
female victims are more willing to confide in other women.’212 The under representation 
of women in positions of authority combined with insufficient resources and inadequate 
training of judicial personnel present further obstacles to justice for victims of rape and 
sexual violence. 
 
The final substantial obstacle, which is inherent in the widespread nature of sexual 
violence during the genocide, is lack of evidence: there have been numerous instances in 
civil and military courts in which ‘the court dismissed rape charges due to lack of direct 
testimony from the victims, who had died following the rape. [In other cases] the court 
held that the testimony of the victim and other witnesses alone did not adequately prove 
that the accused committed rape.’213 As it stands, victims of sexual violence are generally 
reluctant to report crimes where there were no other witnesses present, for fear of not 
being believed.214This issue, therefore, is particularly difficult to resolve, because even if 
rules of procedure and evidence are scrupulously followed, when the judges decide the 
evidence is insufficient, the subsequent dismissal of charges ultimately contributes to 
shattering victims’ faith in the justice system—an element so essential to the process of 
transitional justice. Among the many other thorny obstacles is the lack of protection for 
witnesses during and after the trial process: as it stands, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
does not require court judgments to redact the names and identifying information of rape 
complainants.215 This lack of privacy and confidentiality leaves victims and witnesses 
vulnerable and reluctant to be forthcoming in terms of reporting crimes of sexual and 
gender-based violence. It is also further evidence that the role of the witness in the 
retributive justice system is secondary, at best, and that justice is focused more on the 
punishment of the individual, rather than on the impact on the victim. 
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IV.3  Rwanda’s Restorative Justice Mechanisms: the Gacaca Courts 
 
Although the Genocide Law laid the foundation for addressing genocide crimes and 
crimes against humanity, the legal system faced overwhelming obstacles in the 
subsequent attempt to implement the law.  After attempting to try genocide suspects 
using the classic legal system, the slow pace of prosecutions and of rendering justice 
resulted in only 6,000 cases being tried out of over 120,000 in a period of five years.216 
At the rate at which the trials were going, it was estimated that it would take possibly 
sixty years to try all detained suspects.217 Given this backlog of cases, the government of 
Rwanda sought an alternative to the classic legal system and turned to the traditional 
gacaca courts. The word gacaca literally means “on the lawn” in reference to the patches 
of grass where members of a community gather to resolve disputes amongst themselves. 
Traditional gacaca is an informal mechanism for conflict resolution at the local level that 
exists at the margins of the State and was used to handle affairs of little or no legal 
consequence. It is important to note, however, that gacaca as practiced in post-
independence Rwanda was not fully informal, because it involved the intervention of 
local authorities to whom the State assigned the responsibility of resolving conflicts that 
occur at the local level.218 Largely, however, the gacaca courts are a community-based 
mechanism generally classified as restorative.219 
 
The decision to utilize the restorative mechanism of traditional gacaca courts to deal with 
the legal crisis came about after a series of nation-wide consultations held over a period 
of one year in which the government consulted with legal experts, civil society, and the 
private sector. The debate centred on the fact that, even though the gacaca courts would 
expedite prosecution and ease the burden on the courts, there was a danger that, if 
conducted in the manner of a truth commission, the process would grant amnesty to 
perpetrators of genocide, which was not a viable option for achieving the goals of justice 
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and reconciliation.220 Aware of the significant obstacles facing restorative mechanisms, 
and taking into account the need to impose punitive measures, as well as the need to 
ensure national and societal reconciliation and reconstruction, a compromise was reached 
that established a modernized adaptation of the traditional courts, as enshrined in the 
Organic Law on Gacaca (hereafter, Gacaca Law), which was adopted in January 2001.221 
The Gacaca Law retained the principles enshrined in the 1996 Genocide Law regarding 
the categorization of suspects, and the provisions for confession and guilty pleas; it 
established approximately 11,000 gacaca courts at different administrative levels—the 
cell, sector, district, and province levels; and—most significantly—it expanded Category 
One to include, not only sexual torture, but the crime of rape as well.222 A subsequent 
Organic Law on the organization and functioning of the gacaca courts was passed in 
2004 which, in line with the provisions within the Rome Statute and the Statute of the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone, provides for the establishment of new safeguards for rape 
victims. Under the 2004 Gacaca Law, rape victims now have three options for private 
testimony in gacaca courts and are also prohibited from publicly confessing to rape, 
ostensibly in order to protect the victim’s identity.223  
 
The gacaca tribunals provide a forum within which the accused is given the opportunity 
either to confess or to answer to the charges against him/her and to provide his/her own 
account; the members of the panel of judges are given the opportunity to question both 
the accused and the general assembly; and the members of community are given the 
opportunity to provide testimony and to seek answers from the accused. This system, 
therefore, seeks to individualize responsibility for the genocide, in the spirit of retributive 
justice, as well as to use an existing mechanism of conflict resolution in order to 
encourage dialogue and promote reconciliation, in the spirit of restorative justice. The 
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new hybrid system of gacaca that was created by the 2001 Gacaca Law, therefore, is 
official and has adopted characteristics of formal justice which distinguishes it from the 
traditional system: trials are no longer voluntary but coercive under the authority of the 
State, sanctions are punitive, the gravity of the crimes treated is much greater, the parties 
concerned are not always present, there are a variety of fixed rules to follow, and there is 
an attempt to create an impartial tribunal.224 On the other hand, elements of traditional 
gacaca are maintained in the sense that the tribunals remain local in character and 
emphasis is placed on social restoration, with a system of reduction of punishments and a 
role for reparations; emphasis on popular participation and the significance of social 
pressure; simplification of the procedures; and the absence of professional judicial 
participation.225 The gacaca court, therefore, is largely a restorative justice mechanism 
that has been adapted to deal with gross violations of human rights, in accordance with 
international human rights law, but it also incorporates elements of retributive justice.   
IV.3.1 Challenges and Limitations to the Gacaca Process 
 
The very nature of gacaca courts, therefore, requires a fusion of elements of retributive 
justice (individual criminal accountability) and restorative justice. Striking a balance 
between the two is precarious and the gacaca system has come under criticism for 
attempting to use a distinctly non-legal mechanism to address legal matters.226 As with 
other mechanisms of restorative justice, however, the gacaca system is intended to work 
in tandem with the formal legal system, particularly when dealing with Category One 
crimes, such as sexual violence. The central difference between Rwanda’s retributive 
mechanisms and this particularly mechanism is the role of women in positions of 
authority. As opposed to Rwanda’s retributive mechanisms, women are better represented 
in gacaca courts where they constitute 36 percent of gacaca judges in pilot courts at the 
cell level.227  This is of particular significance because, presently, the gacaca system 
represents the main avenue for legal redress of genocide and related crimes. Even victims 
of Category One crimes, like sexual violence, face the pre-trial gacaca process before 
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their cases are transferred to and adjudicated in the classic courts. Following the pilot 
phase, the State and gacaca officials recognized the deficiencies inherent in the gacaca 
process with respect to protection of sexual violence victims and witnesses, which led to 
the reforms included in the 2004 Gacaca Law.228 As it stands, a rape victim has three 
options: testimony before a single gacaca judge of her choosing; testimony to a judicial 
police officer or prosecutorial personnel, to be followed by complete processing of the 
rape case by the prosecutor’s office. 229  The primacy accorded to crimes of sexual 
violence, the engendering of the bench, and the safeguards put in place by the gacaca 
courts theoretically provide a more enabling atmosphere for dealing with crimes of sexual 
and gender-based violence. There remain, however, some significant limitations arising 
out of the restorative nature of this mechanism. 
 
The primary limitation arises out of the very nature of gacaca courts: witness testimony 
before the public. In Rwanda, where few of the actual witnesses to the crimes committed 
during the genocide have survived, the system of accusations and of giving testimony is 
fragile. The general assembly of gacaca courts is composed of all members of the 
community, including the accused and their families and peers. Consequently, according 
to a study of the gacaca pilot phase, ‘limitations arise from the small population of 
survivors who are available to testify…and psychosocial factors related to the climate of 
distrust and division.’230 The study maintains that when it comes to providing testimony, 
in one of the communities in which the gacaca process was first tested, ‘it seemed that 
the sentiment of not wanting to attract enemies (kutiteranya) prevailed within the general 
population.’231 This tension-filled atmosphere is even more so for victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence due to their ever-present fear of stigmatisation, reprisals, and 
social rejection.  
 
Since the launch of the pilot program in June 2002, 581 gacaca courts in ten provinces 
had registered approximately 134 cases of rape or sexual torture, as compared to 
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approximately 3,308 cases of non-sexual violence crimes, such as murder, assault, or 
looting, brought before the same courts.232 It is evident from the numbers that women are 
not coming forward to report crimes of sexual violence primarily due to the very public 
nature of the gacaca process. Notwithstanding the protections provided for in the gacaca 
law, the small population of local communities gives rise to the fear that even when 
testifying in camera, victims’ privacy will be compromised.233 This fear is not unfounded, 
according to Penal Reform International, who has reported that rape victims, whose 
gacaca testimony may lead to life imprisonment or the death penalty for their alleged 
rapist, commonly face threats by fellow community members.234  Reprisal attacks on 
gacaca judges and on witnesses themselves have injected the already charged atmosphere 
of the gacaca courts with renewed fear and apprehension,235which is felt most profoundly 
by the most vulnerable survivors—women and girls who continue to suffer the physical 




From the above discussion, it is clear that Rwanda’s experience with transitional justice 
mechanisms both at the international level and at the national level reinforces the fact 
that, in any transitional society, the path to justice and reconciliation must also involve 
the institution of the supplementary safeguards to address society’s specific needs. 
Rwanda recognized the limitations of employing either a strictly retributive or a strictly 
restorative mechanism by adopting its hybrid gacaca system. However, this mechanism 
itself still faces significant limitations. The approach to addressing such mass violations 
of human rights, therefore, must be multidimensional in nature, in order for the process to 
be truly effective and to create sustainable peace and reconciliation. The lack of 
specialized attention to crimes of sexual and gender-based violence relegates the crimes 
to secondary status, in relation to other war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes 
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of genocide. While drafting legislation and creating transitional justice mechanisms are 
the first crucial steps on the path to justice and reconciliation in transitional societies, 
these steps must be followed by an implementation process that provides additional 
protection for victims of sexual and gender-based violence. Without these safeguards in 
place, legislation is essentially rendered ineffectual, and victims will continue to be re-
victimized, will choose to remain silent out of fear, and will therefore be left without any 
true form of redress. The following chapter concludes the dissertation by expounding on 
the comprehensive model of transitional justice proposed in Chapter III in order to 
identify the factors necessary for the establishment of an appropriate model of transitional 













The challenges and limitations outlined above ascertain that, in dealing with crimes of 
sexual and gender-based violence, relying on either a purely retributive or a purely 
restorative approach to justice results in the inevitable oversight of other key factors 
crucial to attaining the goals of transitional justice. Indeed, justice and reconciliation are 
processes that require unique approaches peculiar to each post-conflict situation. The 
prevalence and impact of sexual and gender-based violence during and in the aftermath 
of conflict necessitates taking into account various components of the justice process, and 
utilizing them in tandem in order to ensure redress for the victims, punishment for the 
perpetrators, and prevention of future violations. When a State relies solely on a single 
mechanism of transitional justice, it is taking a subjective approach to transitional justice, 
one that views justice through a narrow lens, focusing on a single element. Consequently, 
other crucial elements of the justice and reconciliation process are not addressed and the 
ultimate aims of transitional justice are not met. This chapter will discuss the merits of 
taking an objective, all-encompassing approach to transitional justice in order to realize 
true justice and reconciliation.  
 
V.2 Comprehensive Model of Transitional Justice 
 
For any State emerging out of conflict, societal reconstruction requires a multi-
dimensional, holistic approach in order to achieve reconciliation and to prevent the 
recurrence of conflict. As such, these countries must employ a comprehensive model of 
transitional justice that combines their transitional justice mechanisms with other judicial 
and non-judicial processes aimed at addressing the factors that could lead to future 
conflict. This model should involve establishing retributive as well as restorative 
mechanisms; instituting legal and institutional reform; encouraging national dialogue and 





based violence. In addition, it is crucial that an effective transitional justice framework 
include the experiences of women and girls, from the outset, not just in terms of 
legislation, but also throughout the implementation process. This, in and of itself, ensures 
that crimes of sexual and gender based violence are brought to the forefront and are no 
longer considered subordinate to other violations of international human rights law.  
 
V.2.1 Establishment of Retributive Justice Mechanisms 
 
A key element of a comprehensive model of transitional justice is establishing individual 
criminal responsibility through prosecutions at the national and/or international level 
through national courts, ad-hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Court, or ‘hybrid’ 
internationalized courts. As is evident from the discussion in the previous chapter, 
however, it is not merely enough to institute retributive mechanisms of transitional justice 
without ensuring clear definitions of sexual and gender based violence in their applicable 
law and without taking steps to engender the investigation and prosecution processes.  In 
Rwanda, for example, in response to some of the challenges outlined in Chapter IV, a 
national strategic plan is in place in Rwanda to raise representation of women on the 
police force from 4% in 2004 to 30% in 2008, and the Ministry of Justice has also begun 
a recruitment campaign to raise the proportion of women in the justice system. 236 
Although these are efforts of which the effects remain yet to be seen, they are 
nevertheless positive developments that recognize the importance of engendering the 
transitional justice system at all levels in order to ensure redress for victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence. Rwanda’s national strategy serves to illustrate the importance of 
instituting specialized measures during both the investigation and prosecution processes 
in order to improve the effectiveness of retributive justice mechanisms. 
 
As established in Chapters III and IV, transitional justice is far more effective in dealing 
with crimes of sexual and gender-based violence when States employ complementary 
mechanisms and rely on additional measures to facilitate implementation of the law. In 
the establishment of an international retributive justice mechanism, for example, it is 
                                                 





imperative that additional measures are implemented to bridge the gap between the court 
and the post-conflict society. As demonstrated by the example of the ICTR, without the 
effective dissemination of information on a regular basis, a victim—and society in 
general—remains alienated from the process thereby compromising true justice and 
reconciliation. In addition, it is crucial that at both the national and international level, the 
prosecutor’s office take the incentive to engender the investigative team, to include 
charges of sexual and gender based violence in indictments, and to broaden the scope of 
crimes of sexual violence that are prosecuted. One of the shortcomings of the 
investigative and prosecutorial process at the ICTR is that only about 1-2% of the 
investigative staff is dedicated to sexual violence and gender-based crimes.237 This is 
demonstrative of the low priority and lack of dedication given to such crimes—a fact 
which is directly reflected in the blatant exclusion of sexual violence charges in 
indictments brought before the Tribunal.   
 
Another crucial aspect that must be included in any prosecutorial strategy is allowing for 
the possibility of widening the scope of crimes classified as crimes of sexual violence. In 
order to effectively prosecute all acts of sexual violence, sexual torture, and sexual 
slavery a prosecutor must take the specific circumstances of the conflict into account and 
seek to include all manner of sexual and gender-based violence, rather than focussing 
simply on rape. Such flexibility could ultimately lead to further development in 
international law. In May 2004, for example, the Special Court of Sierra Leone’s Trial 
Chamber approved the addition of ‘forced marriage’ to the counts contained in an 
indictment against six defendants. 238  This decision ‘mark[ed] the first time that an 
international court recognized ‘forced marriage’ as a possible category of ‘other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health’239 within the legal definition of crimes 
against humanity.240 Without the political will of the prosecutor’s office to broaden the 
definition of sexual and gender-based violence, this development would not have 
                                                 
237 Nowrojee Supra note 7 at 96. 
238 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request 
for Leave to Amend the Indictment (May 6, 2004) in Nowrojee Supra note 7 at 101. 
239 Special Court Statute Supra note 90 at Article 2.  





occurred. It must be noted, however, that this type of development is directly reflective of 
the proactive attitude of an individual prosecutor and her/his commitment to address 
crimes of sexual and gender based violence. Retributive mechanisms of transitional 
justice, therefore, whether at the national or international level, should include a set 
mandate within the prosecutor’s office that includes a commitment to engender the 
investigation process and to prosecute crimes of sexual and gender based violence 
alongside other gross violations of human rights. This commitment should also be 
reflected in the establishment of complementary restorative justice mechanisms, a key 
component of a comprehensive transitional justice model.  In addition to instituting 
retributive mechanisms, States should also establish community-based mechanisms 
centered on truth-telling through confessions of perpetrators and testimony of victims and 
witnesses. 
 
V.2.2 Establishment of Restorative Justice Mechanisms 
 
As with mechanisms of retributive justice, restorative mechanisms must also include 
crimes of sexual and gender based violence in their mandates, and institute specialized 
mechanisms in order to ensure the participation and protection of victims. In Rwanda, for 
example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Gacaca Law has undergone reform 
that provides for specialized measures to deal specifically with crimes of sexual and 
gender based violence. Furthermore, in addition to previously existing training sessions 
for gacaca judges concerning procedure, ethics, trauma management, and genocide law, 
another training program has been initiated aimed at training higher-level gacaca judges 
in sexual and gender-based violence training, specifically. Due to insufficient resources 
and logistical constraints, however, the program could only reach 150,000 cell-level 
gacaca judges.241 Indeed, the success of training and recruitment programs depends a 
great deal on available resources.  Nevertheless, lack of adequate resources 
notwithstanding, this is a crucial advancement: the recognition that special training is 
needed concerning these crimes and the effort to engender the gacaca process are 
positive developments. The combined effects of instituting such training programs, 






ensuring the election and appointment of a significant percentage of female judges and 
members of staff (as mentioned above in Chapter IV), and the implementing the reforms 
reflected in the 2004 Gacaca Law are such that the gacaca environment can potentially 
become more accommodating for victims who have heretofore been reluctant to bring 
accusations or to testify.  Restorative justice mechanisms, therefore, must provide victims 
of sexual and gender-based violence with the option of such an enabling atmosphere in 
order to afford them respect and dignity and represents the recognition of the 
psychosocial impact of such crimes. This, in turn, lays the groundwork for the eventual 
realization of justice and reconciliation, provided these mechanisms work in concert with 
retributive mechanisms. 
 
In recognition of the need to utilize complementary mechanisms of transitional justice, 
Rwanda is currently employing a dual approach that emphasizes both the importance of 
establishing individual and command responsibility, and the importance of truth-telling 
and of ensuring that the voices of victims are heard. There is danger, however, of these 
voices remaining silent, if victims of sexual and gender-based violence are not accorded 
the necessary protection in each forum of transitional justice through the institution of 
specialized mechanisms, as discussed above. In terms of retributive justice mechanisms, 
whether national or international, criminal prosecutions, as Franke correctly argues, 
‘must surely be one component of a comprehensive program of transitional justice, yet 
standing alone they necessarily fall short in delivering full justice for gender-related 
atrocities of the recent past.’242 The fact that there is no real role for victims in a formal 
legal mechanism means that justice is only focused on the punishment of the accused, 
and as such has no real, sustained impact on the victims themselves. In fact, without the 
necessary measures in place to protect victims, the process of participating in the trial 
process can lead to re-victimization. As such, it is necessary that victims be made to feel 
part of the legal process, in order for true justice to be realized. In much the same way, 
restorative justice mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions and 
traditional courts require that victims feel a part of the process. In terms of sexual and 
gender based violence, this necessitates the implementation of special measures aimed 
                                                 





specifically at survivors, judges/commissioners, and the public in general, in order to 
ensure an enabling environment. In addition, since restorative justice mechanisms are not 
legal in nature, they must ensure that they are complying with international human rights 
standards in order to afford protection for victims.243 Ensuring this compliance can be 
facilitated by the reform of legislation and of institutions in order to reflect international 
human rights developments. 
 
V.2.3 Legislative and Institutional Reform 
 
In addition to establishing the transitional justice mechanisms discussed above, it is 
imperative that every transitional society emerging from conflict undertakes the reform of 
archaic institutions and legislation that may have contributed to a culture of impunity and 
lack of respect for human rights and rule of law. In terms of legislation, laws must be 
reformed in order to ensure the harmonization of international and domestic law. As has 
been illustrated in Chapter IV, Rwanda has undergone certain legal reforms that bring its 
national laws in line with international law, in terms of discrimination and in terms of 
sexual and gender based violence in the context of genocide. It has also been noted, 
however, that the lack of a definition of rape in the Penal Code has resulted in 
inconsistent verdicts. It must be emphasized that transitional justice cannot be effective if 
domestic law does not reflect international human rights standards by providing for clear 
definitions of crimes of sexual and gender based violence.  Neglecting to implement legal 
reforms directly contributes to the entrenchment of a culture of impunity for perpetrators 
of all crimes, including those of sexual and gender based violence.   
 
In addition to legislative reform, it is crucial that transitional States also undertake reform 
of other non-judicial institutions or national bodies in order to eradicate impunity, 
promote adherence to rule of law, and ultimately pave the road towards reconciliation. In 
Rwanda, for example, the country’s efforts at achieving national reconciliation have 
included holding democratic elections at the local, regional, and Presidential level; the 
launching of national poverty reduction strategy, Vision 20/20, that aims to eradicate 






poverty by the year 2020; and the establishment of a Human Rights Commission, a Law 
Reform Commission, and a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission—the latter of 
which has undertaken extensive campaigns within communities, prisons, refugee camps, 
and rehabilitation camps in order to sensitize the population as regards the policy of 
national unity and reconciliation, and to encourage participation in national dialogue. All 
of these elements are dynamic and crosscutting and rely upon each other to build a 
cohesive foundation for the reconstruction of Rwandan society. In the end, the effective 
functioning of all transitional justice mechanisms—particularly as pertains to sexual and 
gender-based violence—will only be possible once victims feel secure enough to fully 
participate in the process. As such, it is imperative that the transitional justice process 
includes the legislative and institutional reform in order to provide post-conflict societies 
with political, social, and economic security. These reforms, however, must be 
supplemented by the encouragement of national dialogue in order to break the silence 
surrounding crimes of sexual and gender-based violence.  
 
V.2.4 National Dialogue and Promotion of Reconciliation 
 
 
A fourth element of a comprehensive model of transitional justice is encouraging 
reconciliation through preservation of memory and initiation and promotion of national 
dialogue, thereby discouraging a conspiracy of silence and eliminating the stigma 
surrounding sexual and gender based violence. Post-conflict societies must examine and 
adequately address the effects of sexual and gender based violence in order to ensure that 
survivors of these crimes do not remain victims, and become active members of society. 
The fear of societal rejection is powerful, and the inability of women and girls to speak of 
sexual violence committed against them can render certain transitional justice 
mechanisms ineffectual. Reconciliation requires openness and dialogue, and as long as 
crimes of sexual and gender based violence are not outwardly addressed, victims will 
remain on the outskirts of society, thereby preventing true reconciliation. To this end, the 
population must be sensitized through outreach programs that encourage adherence to 





of stigma and shame are removed and a zero-tolerance policy is instituted. As 
demonstrated by the situation in Rwanda, a key reason why victims of sexual violence 
are forthcoming with their stories is because they are unaware of their options. 
Implementing programs that disseminate information and encourage dialogue can 
perhaps have the most profound impact not only on victims of sexual and gender-based 
violence, but on society in general in terms of creating an atmosphere that fosters 
reconciliation. In addition, through such dialogue, States can identify appropriate means 




Finally, it must be recognized that the economic situation of survivors of mass conflict is 
drastically affected by conflict, and in most cases women and girls are left behind to take 
on the role of sole providers.  Victims of sexual and gender based violence, in particular, 
are left to contend with a myriad of physical and psychological illnesses that gravely 
compromise their ability to survive, let alone to provide for their families. In many post-
conflict societies, women are dealing with HIV/AIDS as a result of sexual violence; 
unwanted pregnancies; poverty; discrimination; and social and economic isolation. The 
effects of sexual and gender based violence in conflict situations, therefore, are 
continuous, complex, and multilayered. Given this, the pursuit of justice must include 
measures that ensure not only that the perpetrators are held accountable for their actions, 
but that adequate redress is provided for the victims of these gross violations of human 
rights, and that provide a solid foundation for the rebuilding of fragmented societies. It is 
in recognition of this, and in the spirit of ensuring justice for these victims that States 
must institute restitution for victims, including financial compensation and provision of 
healthcare and education. For example, States should develop and widely implement 
special programs established for women and girls living with HIV/AIDS as a 
consequence of sexual violence. These programs should include elements that address 
both the physical and psychological implications of the HIV/AIDS, and involve outreach 
elements aimed at the community at large in order to demystify the disease thereby 





many forms, other than the traditional form of punishment of the offender. Furthermore, 
restitution is a crucial element of the transitional justice process, and in societies where 
resources are limited and monetary compensation is not viable, reparations can be 
indirectly instituted through the establishment of such programs aimed at the victims of 
conflict.  
 
At the heart of this comprehensive model of transitional justice is the fact that although 
the past decade has given rise to groundbreaking achievements in terms of the 
criminalization of conflict related sexual and gender based violence, transitional societies 
continue to struggle with identifying the tools necessary to adequately address such 
crimes. Many of the challenges facing transitional societies stem from the subordinate 
status thus far accorded to crimes of this nature as enshrined not only in legislation, but in 
societal and cultural norms as well. As such, judicial and non-judicial transitional justice 
mechanisms must work in concert to reverse previously enshrined notions of this 
subordinates status, thereby arming post-conflict societies with the tools to eradicate 
impunity for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. In addition to establishing 
retributive and restorative transitional justice mechanisms, therefore, the pursuit of justice 
and reconciliation in transitional societies must include reform of archaic laws in order to 
provide for equal rights for women and girls; reform or establishment of institutions that 
allow for greater political and social participation of women and girls; and 
encouragement of national dialogue with particular emphasis placed on education and 
training for women and girls, particularly education on health and legal matters. Knowing 
their rights and learning how to exercise them will provide women and girls with the 
tools necessary for self-empowerment and they will no longer be in a position of total 
dependence that may leave them economically vulnerable. Furthermore, this will 
contribute to the eventual eradication of any traditionally enshrined notion of women as 
subordinates or as objects or as property—an underlying notion that provided some 
justification for the brutal and widespread sexual violence that took place during and in 
the aftermath of conflict. Ultimately, the success of any transitional justice process that 





not women and girls are provided with an enabling environment that allows them to feel 




Transitional justice is a fundamental tool with which post-conflict societies can begin to 
rebuild their seemingly irreparable shattered and deeply fragmented societies. The 
ultimate aim of transitional justice is not to restore societies to what they once were, but 
to reformulate various components of State and society in order to effect justice and 
reconciliation. In the context of sexual and gender-based violence, justice and 
reconciliation can only be realized if the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms 
is a comprehensive and engendered process, and reflects struggle to enshrine such crimes 
as violations of international human rights law comparable in gravity to other war crimes, 
crimes of genocide, and crimes against humanity. As has been established, the past 
decade has been crucial in the development of international human rights law as pertains 
to sexual and gender-based violence. Rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual slavery, 
and forced labour have been woven tightly into the fabric of conflict situations for 
centuries. The pervasiveness of such acts, however, has not been adequately reflected 
within the sphere of international law, until relatively recently. The mid 1990s saw 
crimes of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence brought to the forefront of 
international legal developments, with the establishment of the International Criminal for 
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Since then, 
significant advancements have been made by these ad-hoc tribunals, the International 
Criminal Court, and by internationalized hybrid courts culminating in the criminalization 
of various forms of sexual and gender-based violence.  
 
However, it is simply not enough to take comfort in the momentous achievements that 
have occurred over the past decade, however, without explicitly recognizing the 
challenges and limitations facing transitional justice mechanisms at both the international 
and national level in terms of implementation. It is evident from the experiences of the 





between international statutory and jurisprudential developments, and the situation on the 
ground within post-conflict societies themselves. As such, there remains much to be done 
within the context of transitional justice to bridge this gap and to ensure that crimes of 
sexual and gender based violence are not just considered as equally as grave as other 
crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity only theoretically, but 
practically as well. In order to realize justice and reconciliation and achieve sustainable 
social reconstruction, it is imperative for post-conflict societies to take an objective, 
holistic approach that takes into consideration all of the factors contributing to and arising 
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